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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-103(2)0) as this is an appeal from a final district court judgment that 
was transferred here from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
This appeal raises three issues. The need to resolve the second and third 
issues is dependent in each instance on the outcome of the previous issue. If the 
Court reverses the district court's judgment based on the first issue, it need not 
reach the second; and if it reverses on the second, it need not reach the third. 
1. The district court abused its discretion by declining to enforce the 
parties' stipulation to apply a 10% prejudgment interest rate after: 
a. The parties agreed to the rate in a court-approved stipulated 
jury instruction to which all objections were waived; 
b. The court withdrew the instruction upon the express 
agreement the court would make the calculation automatically; and 
c. The court articulated the calculation would be made using 
the approved and agreed 10% rate, with no objection from any party. 
2. The district court incorrectly failed to apply the 10% prejudgment 
interest rate of Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 to negligence-based choses in action, 
contrary to the controlling case law of this Court and the Supreme Court. 
• 
3. The district court abused its discretion by applying a low 2015 post-
judgment interest rate when prejudgment interest began running in 2007. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. "Normally,' a district court's decision to enforce a stipulation is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion."' State v. Beckstrom, 2013 UT App 186, if 12 
n.5, 307 P.3d 677 (quoting Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, if 10,296 
P.3d 709) . 
2. The application of the legal rate in Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 as 
prejudgment interest for negligence-based property damage choses in action is a 
legal question reviewed for correctness. See Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT 
App 119, ,r 21,350 P.3d 615 ("When our review requires us to examine statutory 
language, we look first to the plain meaning of the statute and then review [the] 
district court's interpretation of a statute for correctness.") (construing Utah 
Code Ann.§ 15-1-1) (citation and quotations omitted). 
3. If the district court had discretion to decide the appropriate rate of 
interest to use, review of discretionary decisions is for abuse of that discretion. 
See Mercado v. Hill, 2012 UT App 44, ,I 8, 273 P.3d 385. 
PRESERVATION BELOW 
The issues presented were preserved in the trial court. (R. 1599-1600, 1631, 
1689, 1702, 1711, 1742-47, 1750-51, 1759-67, 1772-81, 1792-97, 1799-1933, 1950-51; 
1969, at 68-73; 1971; 1973; Addendum Exhibits 1-8.) 
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RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION 
The following statutory provision is implicated by the second issue raised 
in this appeal, if the Court reaches that issue: 
Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2) (2013). Prior versions of the statute are attached as 
Addendum Exhibit 9. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal asks the Court to apply the proper rate of prejudgment 
interest to a jury award for property damage based on negligence. The 
defendants stipulated to using the 10% statutory legal interest rate, then reneged 
once the verdict went against them. The district judge let the defendants out of 
their stipulation, then applied a 2.27% post-judgment rate when entering final 
judgment. 
This brief discusses the proper prejudgment interest rate by addressing 
successive dependent issues presented for review. If the Court reverses on any 
issue presented, it need not address any succeeding issue. 
The first issue is whether this Court should enforce a stipulation reached 
between the parties that a 10% prejudgment interest rate applied to the 
prejudgment interest award. This stipulation was entered after the parties had 
already agreed to a jury instruction containing that rate. The instruction was 
3 
• 
• 
withdrawn on the express agreement that the court would automatically 
calculate prejudgment interest if the jury awarded property damages. The court 
articulated on the record the parties' understanding that the 10% calculation 
would be made by the court, and no party objected. The jury then awarded 
property damages as contemplated by the stipulation and ruling. The district 
court nevertheless declined to enforce the rate agreed to by stipulation. This 
Court should enforce the stipulation by reversing and remanding for entry of a 
judgment applying the agreed 10% rate. 
If, however, the Court declines to enforce the stipulation for whatever 
reason, it should nevertheless conclude that the applicable rate for prejudgment 
interest in this case is the statutory legal rate of 10% from Utah Code Ann. § 15-
1-1. Both this Court and the Supreme Court hold that this rate applies to 
negligence-based claims like those on which the jury awarded property 
damages in this case. Thus, if the Court reaches this issue, the Court should 
reverse and remand for entry of a judgment applying the 10% statutory 
prejudgment interest rate. 
If the Court decides not to enforce the stipulation and also determines not 
to use the statutory legal rate of interest, the Court should reverse and remand 
for use of an appropriate rate of interest reflective of the forbearance of payment 
in this case. The district court used a low 2015 post-judgment interest rate 
without any explanation or justification. The interest rate should be reflective at 
4 
least of the rates in place when interest began running, which were significantly 
higher than the one used by the district court. The district court also eschewed 
case law using a "middle ground" rate. Case law using a post-judgment interest 
rate does not apply here, and the district court exceeded its discretion in 
applying it. 
Under any of these approaches, this Court should reverse and remand. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This case went to trial on the plaintiffs' claims for failure of the defendant 
insurance agents to put in place adequate insurance coverage for them. (R. 1230-
36; 1969, at 87-131.) The plaintiffs suffered six-figure property damage in a fire, 
only to discover their agents had put in place a mere $3,000 of insurance despite 
their request for full coverage. (R. 1230-36, 1864, 1930; 1969, at 128; Pis.' Trial 
Exs. 18, 21-24.) The plaintiffs sued in contract and tort. (R. 1230-36.) 
On the first day of trial, the parties submitted stipulated jury instructions 
that included an instruction on prejudgment interest. (R. 1599-1600, 1631.) The 
rate agreed to in the instruction was 10%. (R. 1631.) The district court approved 
the instruction and included it in the final set to be given to the jury. (R. 1689, 
1702; 1969, at 68, 70.) 
Before the instruction was given, the defendants asked to withdraw the 
instruction and replace it with a stipulation that prejudgment interest would be 
awarded on the same basis as a matter of course by the district court if the jury 
5 
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returned a verdict for the plaintiffs on its claim for personal property damage. 
(R. 1969, at 70-73.) The plaintiffs agreed. (R. 1969, at 72-73.) The district judge 
accepted the stipulation, articulated specifically that the 10% calculation would 
be used, and stated his approval of the amount. (R. 1969, at 72-73.) No party 
objected to this ruling. (R. 1969, at 73.) The jury then returned a verdict for the 
plaintiffs awarding damages for the value of lost property based on agent 
negligence and negligent misrepresentation. (R. 1733-34.) 
After trial, the plaintiffs moved for entry of judgment on the verdict to 
include prejudgment interest of 10%. (R. 1742-47.) Notwithstanding their prior 
stipulation, the defendants opposed the motion on grounds they had not 
stipulated to such an award. (R. 1759-67.) They also argued for the first time that 
a different interest rate should apply, though they did not propose any different 
rate. (R. 1763-65.) 
Following a hearing on the matter, the district court issued a 
memorandum decision stating that no stipulation had been reached with respect 
to an absolute award of prejudgment interest. (R. 1792-97; 1971.) The court then 
asked for simultaneous supplemental briefing on an award of prejudgment 
interest in the absence of a stipulation. (R. 1796; 1972, at 2-3.) In its supplemental 
brief, the defendants proposed for the first time that the court use Utah's post-
judgment interest rate as the prejudgment interest rate in this case. (R. 1808-10.) 
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At the hearing following the submission of supplemental briefs, the 
district court, acting sua sponte, partially reversed its prior memorandum 
decision after listening to the recorded stipulation from the trial. (R. 1973, at 1-
12.) The court ruled that the parties had in fact reached a binding stipulation 
with respect to the award of prejudgment interest, and ordered it to run from 
June 13, 2007. (R. 1973, at 12-13.) The court declined, however, to use the 10% 
rate previously agreed to by the parties and approved by the court. (R. 1973, at 
20.) Instead, the court decided to apply the 2015 post-judgment interest rate of 
2.27%. (R. 1973, at 20-21.) The court gave no explanation for this choice. (R. 1973, 
at 20.) The court then entered judgment for the plaintiffs using this rate for the 
prejudgment award. (R. 1950-51.) 
The plaintiffs have appealed the district court's interest rate 
determination. (R. 1954-55.) This is the sole focus of this appeal. The defendants 
have not cross-appealed with respect to any portion of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs are David and Ruth M. Fuller, husband and wife, and their 
wholly owned small business, Fuller's Appliance Parts and Service, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company (collectively the "Fullers"). (R. 1230.) The Fullers 
purchased insurance on their home, business, and vehicles through Denise 
Bohne (pronounced "Bonnie") and Western States Insurance Agency of Spanish 
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Fork, Utah ("Western States"). (R. 1230-32.) They sought full coverage for all of 
their personal and business property. (R. 1231; 1969, at 91.) 
On February 3, 2007, a fire destroyed the Fullers' home in Springville, 
Utah, where their business was located. (R. 1232.) The Fullers made claim on the 
business insurance coverage that Bohne and Western States had purportedly 
put in place for them, only to find they were significantly underinsured. (Pls.' 
Trial Exs. 21-24, 26.) After receiving a check for $3,000 as the sum total of the 
insurance coverage in place, the Fullers sued Bohne and Western States. (R. 1, 
1230, 1864; 1969, at 128; Pis.' Trial Ex. 18.) 
The Fullers demonstrated at trial, inter alia, that Bohne and Western States 
(hereafter collectively "Western States" or the "Western States defendants" 
unless otherwise indicated) had placed the Fullers' signatures on insurance 
applications without the Fullers' knowledge and had used them to obtain 
coverage different in kind and amount than that which the Fullers had 
requested. (R. 1969, at 96-102, 114-15; Pis.' Trial Exs. 1, 58-61; Defs.' Trial Ex. 29.) 
The Fullers sought damages for breach of the defendants' duties as insurance 
agents, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and negligent misrepresentation. (R. 1230-36, 1733-34.) The damages 
alleged included the value of business equipment, inventory, and tools lost in 
the fire, and prejudgment interest on this lost personal property. (R. 1230-36, 
1702, 1733-34; 1969, at 68-73; Pls.' Trial Exs. 21-24.) The Fullers also claimed lost 
8 
rental value from the loss of use of their home. (R. 1734; R. 1969, at 128-29; Pis.' 
Trial Ex. 56.) 
The Fullers contemporaneously catalogued and detailed their property 
damages in inventories that were submitted at trial as Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 22 
(Personal Property Inventory) and supported further by Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibits 
21 (Proof of Loss), 23 (Inventory of Parts), and 24 (Appliances for Sale). All 
property damages related to lost equipment, tools, and inventory. (Pls.' Trial 
Exs. 21-24.) 
On the first day of trial, the parties stipulated to certain legal instructions 
to be given to the jury. (R. 1599-1600.) These included Instruction No. 29, which 
provided as follow: 
Prejudgment Interest 
The Fullers seek recovery of prejudgment interest as part of their 
loss. In Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where 
the damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, 
and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. If you find for the 
Fullers on their claim of prejudgment interest, you should award them 
10% annually on the value of their proven loss from the date of the fire to 
the date of your verdict. 
(R. 1631 & Addend. Ex. 2.) Western States agreed this was an accurate statement 
of the law and stipulated to its contents. (R. 1969, at 68, 70, 1702 & Addend. Exs. 
3-4.) The district court approved the instruction, included it in the final 
instructions, and was prepared to give it to the jury. (R. 1969, at 70, 1702; 
Addend. Exs. 3-4.) 
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Shortly before the jury was instructed, Western States asked the court to 
withdraw this instruction and have prejudgment interest decided by the trial 
court. (R. 1969, at 70-72 & Addend. Ex. 4.) When the Fullers balked at this 
request, Western States, under questioning from the court, confirmed the 
addition of prejudgment interest to an award of property damages would be 
automatic if the jury in fact awarded personal property damages. (R. 1969, at 71-
72.) The offer was given in exchange for removing a third line from the special 
verdict form allowing the jury to award the Fullers prejudgment interest in 
addition to property damages and rent damages. (R. 1734; 1969, at 69-73.) The 
Fullers accepted this offer and the trial court agreed to this approach. (R. 1969, at 
72-73.) The court then articulated on the record the understanding that the 
interest would be calculated by the court at 10% per annum, as per the 
previously stipulated jury instruction, and that the court was "fine" with this 
amount. (R. 1969, at 73.) No party objected to the court's decision. (R. 1969, at 
73.) 
The relevant portions of the transcript reflect first the specific stipulation 
between the parties to the substance and content of the final jury instructions, 
including Instruction No. 29, which contained the 10% interest rate as the rate to 
be applied in the case: 
THE COURT: So this is a full and complete set? Yes? 
MR. BARRETT [Counsel for Western States]: It is, Your Honor. 
10 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN [Counsel for the Fullers]: Yes, Your Honor. 
(R. 1969, at 70; see also R. 1689-1710.) Then, after stipulating to the instructions, 
Western States spontaneously proposed withdrawing Instruction No. 29 and 
having the court simply apply prejudgment interest automatically if property 
damages were awarded. (R. 1969, at 70-71.) The record reflected the offer, 
acceptance, and district court approval, and articulation of the stipulation to 
apply the 10% rate with no objection from any party: 
MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, if we can, we were having discussion 
about whether the special verdict form should allow, in addition to a 
damage line for property as well as a damage line for rent, whether it 
should also have prejudgment interest. And during the break, I was able 
to look at the MUJI, Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, special 
verdict form CV 1899, and it is in the context of a fraud instruction, which 
is a variation of the negligent misrepresentation, so I realize it's not 
particularly analogous, but in this, it indicates that counsel should specify 
the type of damages, in this case economic and non-economic. Our case, 
there are no non. And damages so the judge can calculate prejudgment 
interest. Your Honor, I would prefer that that remain the situation here. 
THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Christiansen. So, I mean, you're 
asking for it, but I - my experience has always been the opposite. Where 
I'm - if there is a dispute, I can - I mean, if there's no dispute -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We've got an instruction in on it. 
THE COURT: We can strike the instruction. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, but I want the jury to decide whether 
they're - whether the plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest. 
You're not saying the Court would make that determination. 
THE COURT: Well, are you - is there any argument about whether 
MR. BARRETT: No -
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THE COURT: -- they' re entitled to prejudgment interest? 
MR. BARRETT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BARRETT: If there's a property damage -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. 
MR. BARRETT: - there's going to be prejudgment interest -
THE COURT: Right, so you' re - it - your - they' re -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Then I'm okay with that. 
THE COURT: Right. Exactly. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: I didn't- I didn't- it's - we're on the same page. I 
don't see that there's a disagreement about whether they're entitled to it 
or not. What I'll do is, it's in there, and when we get to it, instruct them to 
just strike it out, that the Court will - well, just strike that out, that that's 
no longer a part of the instructions. And you can tell them that. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. Can we take that instruction out 
completely from the jury? 
THE COURT: Just rip out instruction 29. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I'll tell them that we're skipping that, that was a 
potential we skipped over. How's that? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. Excellent. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, so take it out- look, part of me - it's a 
simple calculation, so I really didn't care much, because it's a 10 percent 
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calculation and you can do it in your head. I also don't think as I said, 
there's any - it's - the amount is fine. But as a technical matter, this is the 
better approach. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yep. Okay, so jury instruction 29 is withdrawn. 
(R. 1969, at 70-73 & Addend. Ex. 5; see also R. 1711.) 
After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for the Fullers and against 
both defendants jointly and severally. (R. 1733-34 & Addend. Ex. 6; R. 1969, at 
64-65.) The jury found Bohne and Western States had breached their duties as 
agents and made negligent misrepresentations to the Fullers that had caused 
them damage. (R. 1733-34.) The jury awarded $101,585 to the Fullers for the 
value of their lost personal property. (R. 1734.) The jury did not award any 
rental damages. (R. 1734.) 
After trial, the Fullers moved for entry of judgment on the verdict. (R. 
1742-47.) Consistent with the prior stipulation reached with Western States, the 
Fullers included prejudgment interest of 10% from 2007 to the time of entry of 
the judgment. (R. 1745-46, 1751.) 
At this point, notwithstanding its prior stipulation, Western States 
opposed inclusion of prejudgment interest in the judgment. (R. 1763-65.) The 
Western States defendants argued (1) they had not stipulated; (2) no 
prejudgment interest was appropriate; and (3) the 10% rate did not apply. (R. 
1763-65.) 
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The district court held a hearing that included addressing this issue. (R. 
1971.) The district judge observed: "I have a specific recollection of sitting here 
as we were going through that, that it struck me that there was a stipulation, 
and that I was a little surprised, actually, Mr. Barrett, that that wasn't - that you 
were just saying, fine, it applies to everything." (R. 1971, at 14-15.) The district 
judge further observed: "I need to go back and listen to the tapes at this 
portion," referring to the recordings of the trial colloquy. (R. 1971, at 14.) 
Western States' counsel argued that it had not been his intent to stipulate to a 
10% rate to be applied to all claims on the property damages and that the jury's 
findings on the tort claims left "a little bit of a muddy water." (R. 1971, at 14.) 
On January 6, 2015, the district court issued a memorandum decision 
ruling that the stipulation did not conclusively decide the prejudgment interest 
issue. (R. 1792-97 & Addend. Ex. 7.) Citing the "prejudgment interest statute," 
Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1, as well as the common law, the court ruled that 
prejudgment interest was in fact awardable for negligence claims and that 
Western States had conceded as much at the hearing. (R. 1795 n.4.) The Court 
also acknowledged the effect of the law incorporated into Jury Instruction No. 
29, which awards prejudgment interest "where the damage is complete, the loss 
can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a 
particular time." (R. 1796.) Nevertheless, the court ruled that while "some of 
those determinations may be made based on the jury's verdict," "some of those 
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determinations have yet to be made." (R. 1796.) The Court therefore asked for 
simultaneous supplemental briefing to be able to make all such remaining 
determinations. (R. 1796; 1972, at 2-3.) 
The parties submitted simultaneous supplemental briefs. (R. 1799, 1829.) 
The court then held a hearing following supplemental briefing. (R. 1973.) At the 
hearing, the court on its own motion partially reversed its prior written decision, 
concluding that the parties had in fact stipulated to the automatic inclusion of 
prejudgment interest if the jury were to find for the Fullers on property damage. 
(R. 1973, 1-12.) The district judge indicated that he had gone back and listened 
again to the recording of the h·ial colloquy: "It appears to me, having gone back 
and listened to the tape very carefully, Mr. Barrett, you did stipulate to the 
availability [of prejudgment interest]. And to the extent that your arguments go 
to the lack of availability, I think that they've been stipulated away." (R. 1973, at 
1-2.) The court replayed portions of the trial colloquy recording in chambers in 
the presence of counsel and reaffirmed this preliminary ruling. (R. 1973, at 7-
12.)1 The court determined that "there was a stipulation as to the entitlement of 
prejudgment interest, and that it was based on that stipulation that Mr. 
Christiansen withdrew instruction 29." (R. 1973, at 12.) The court concluded that 
1 Although the transcript suggests this was a telephonic hearing, the hearing 
actually took place in open court and involved counsel and the court recessing 
to the judge's chambers together to listen to portions of the prior trial recording. 
(R. 1973, at 7.) 
15 
"to the extent anything in my memorandum decision is inconsistent with ... 
this ruling, I'm vacating that portion of the memorandum decision." (R. 1973, at 
12.) 
The district judge then took the question of the proper prejudgment 
interest rate under advisement and scheduled a conference call later that day to 
announce his ruling. (R. 1973, at 18.) During the subsequent conference call (R. 
1973, at 19), the judge announced his ruling without elaboration: "I am 
convinced that the post judgment rate is appropriate, not the 10 percent rate in 
this matter." (R. 1973, at 20 & Addend. Ex. 8.) The court then awarded the 2015 
post-judgment interest rate of 2.27% as prejudgment interest. (R. 1973, at 20-21.)2 
The district court entered judgment on the verdict on February 24, 2015. 
(R. 1950-51 & Addend. Ex. 1.)3 The judgment included prejudgment interest of 
2.27% from June 13, 2007, to the date of enh·y of the judgment. (R. 1951.) The 
Fullers timely appealed the interest rate decision. (R. 1954.) Bohne and Western 
States have not cross-appealed any portion of the judgment. 
2 See Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-4(3)(a); 
http://~ww.utcqurts.gov/rcsourcQ_s/_intratcs/intcn~sh·atcs.htm. 
3 Judgment was entered by the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, as Judge Himonas 
had by that point stepped down from the trial bench to take his seat on the 
Supreme Court. (R. 1950.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse and remand with an order that an amended 
judgment be entered in favor of the Fullers with prejudgment interest calculated 
at 10% per annum. The district court's post-trial rulings with respect to this 
issue were erroneous. 
First, the district court abused its discretion by refusing to fully enforce 
the parties' stipulation. The parties stipulated to, and the district court 
approved, the use of the 10% prejudgment interest rate in connection with the 
agreed jury instructions. Western States therefore waived any objection to the 
use of a different rate. Furthermore, the parties agreed to withdrawal of the jury 
instruction in exchange for an automatic calculation by the court in the event the 
jury awarded property damages - which the jury in fact awarded. The court 
articulated the agreed understanding on the record that the calculation would 
take place using the 10% rate agreed to by the parties. There was no objection to 
this articulation because that in fact reflected the parties' understanding; any 
objection was therefore waived. The lower court should have held the Western 
States defendants to their agreement when they reneged after losing the jury 
verdict. The court abused its discretion by failing to do so. Stipulations will be 
enforced by the courts, act as an estoppel against a party seeking to change its 
mind, and are conclusive of all matters necessarily included in the stipulation. 
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This Court should reverse the decision below and fully enforce the parties' 
stipulation. 
If the Court reverses based on Western States' stipulation and waiver, it 
need not reach any further issue. Otherwise, the Court should address the 
applicability of the 10% prejudgment interest rate in Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1. 
Under a long line of cases beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Fell v. 
Union Pacific RR, 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907), and continuing on with Uinta Pipeline 
Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976), and through to the present, 
the Utah appellate courts hold that the rate for prejudgment interest in non-
personal-injury negligence cases is the legal rate currently found in Utah Code 
Ann.§ 15-1-1(2). The use of that rate has been affirmed by this Court as recently 
as five months ago in Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT App 119,350 P.3d 615. 
Language found in two Supreme Court decisions in other contexts neither 
overrules Fell nor provides binding or persuasive contrary direction to the 
longstanding jurisprudence of this state. Nor do federal cases cited by Western 
States. If the Court reaches this issue, it should reverse and remand for entry of 
an amended judgment using the 10% statutory rate in Section 15-1-1. 
Lastly, if the Court does not enforce the parties' stipulation and also 
determines not to apply the legal rate, the Court should nevertheless reverse 
and remand. The district court chose to apply the post-judgment interest rate 
applicable in 2015 to interest that began to run in 2007. The court gave no 
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rationale for its decision. This is a significant discount off the prevailing rate at 
the time prejudgment interest began to run. It also ignores "middle ground" 
rates used by the federal courts and opts instead for a low rate used in case law 
interpreting and applying statutes not at issue here. If the Court does not 
reverse on other grounds, the Court should reverse and remand with 
instructions to apply a rate that articulates the reasons why and approximates 
the loss to the Fullers based on their forbearance on the money they lost. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
ENFORCE THE PARTIES' ENTIRE STIPULATION ON 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, INCLUDING THE AGREED 10% RATE. 
Prior to instructing the jury, the parties stipulated to the instructions to be 
given, and the court approved the law. This included Jury Instruction No. 29, 
which read: 
Prejudgment Interest 
The Fullers seek recovery of prejudgment interest as part of their 
loss. In Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where 
the damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, 
and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. If you find for the 
Fullers on their claim of prejudgment interest, you should award them 
10% annually on the value of their proven loss from the date of the fire to 
the date of your verdict. 
(R. 1631, emphasis added.) Western States agreed this was an accurate statement 
of the law and stipulated to its contents. (R. 1969, at 68, 70, 1702.) The district 
court approved and was prepared to give the instruction. (R. 1969, at 70, 1702.) 
19 
As the jury instructions were about to be given, Western States suggested 
that prejudgment interest should be awarded by the judge and need not be a 
part of the jury's deliberations. (R. 1969, at 70-71.) Western States sought 
ostensibly to remove an opportunity for the jury to award more damages to the 
Fullers and to eliminate an additional line from the special verdict form that was 
to be included for that purpose. (R. 1969, at 68-70.) The Fullers initially resisted 
this request and sought to have the jury instructed as agreed. (R. 1969, at 71-72.) 
At that point, however, Western States offered to stipulate that the prejudgment 
interest that would otherwise be instructed to the jury would simply be added 
on to the amount awarded by the verdict. (R. 1969, at 72.) It was only after 
receiving confirmation from Western States and the court that this would 
happen in an automatic fashion, as offered by Western States via stipulation, 
that the Fullers agreed. (R. 1969, at 72-73.) As evidenced by the colloquy at trial, 
the Fullers in no way would have agreed otherwise. (R. 1969, at 68-73.) The 
district court articulated the understanding that the rate would be automatically 
applied at 10%, and no party objected. (R. 1969, at 73.) 
Western States subsequently sought to renege on this stipulation and 
catch the Fullers in a "gotcha." The Western States defendants argued that they 
did not agree to prejudgment interest, that no prejudgment interest should be 
awarded and that, if it was, it should be at some other rate than that agreed to in 
Jury Instruction No. 29. (R. 1763-65.) 
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The district court originally agreed with Western States. (R. 1795-96.) 
However, upon further review, the district court confirmed that Western States 
had in fact stipulated to an award of prejudgment interest as the Fullers had 
argued. (R. 1973, at 1-12.) At that point, the lower court should have enforced 
the stipulation by its terms, including the agreed 10% rate. Instead, the court 
enforced only part of the stipulation and overlooked the rate previously agreed 
to by the parties and approved by the judge himself. This ruling should be 
reversed for three independent reasons. 
First, Western States waived any objections to the rate by stipulating to 
the substance of Jury Instruction No. 29. "Generally, if a party fails to object to a 
jury instruction, that party waives any objection thereto." Walker v. Hansen, 2003 
UT App 237, ,r 17, 74 P.3d 635. Western States stipulated to the instruction 
containing the 10% rate and thereby waived any objection to it. Nothing about 
the subsequent colloquy with the Court "undid" that waiver with respect to the 
agreed rate. Indeed, there was no discussion whatsoever about potentially using 
a different rate in withdrawing the instruction. The Fullers were entitled to rely 
on the fact that this was a settled issue and that any objection had been waived. 
Second, the parties reached an express stipulation on the record, in open 
court, that the prejudgment interest standard reflected in the instruction would 
be enforced as per the instruction. The district court approved the stipulation, 
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articulated that the interest calculation would be automatic, articulated the 
usage of the 10% rate, and approved the rate itself: 
THE COURT: Well, are you - is there any argument about whether 
MR. BARRETT: No-
THE COURT: -- they're entitled to prejudgment interest? 
MR. BARRETT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BARRETT: If there's a property damage -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay . 
MR. BARRETT: - there's going to be prejudgment interest -
THE COURT: ... I don't see that there's a disagreement about 
whether they're entitled to it or not. ... 
THE COURT: ... [I]t's a simple calculation, so I really didn't care 
much, because it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it in your head. 
I also don't think as I said, there's any - it's - the amount is fine .... 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yep. Okay, so jury instruction 29 is withdrawn. 
(R. 1969, at 71-73.) 
The Supreme Court and this Court both hold that such a stipulation 
settles the issue and should not be subject to later collateral attack: 
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"A stipulation is an admission which may not be disregarded or set 
aside at will." Generally, stipulations are binding on the parties and the 
court. Thus, a stipulation entered into by the parties and accepted by the 
court II acts as an estoppel upon the parties thereto and is conclusive of all 
matters necessarily included in the stipulation." ... [S]uch contract if 
lawful has ... all the binding effect of findings of fact and conclusions of 
law made by the court." Further, while 11 [a] court may modify its findings, 
... it cannot change or modify a contract of the parties." 
Thus, when a court adopts a stipulation of the parties, the issues to 
which the parties have stipulated become" settled" and "not reserved for 
future consideration." ... 
Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ,r,r 13-14, 296 P.3d 709 (citations 
omitted). Accord State v. Beckstrom, 2013 UT App 186, ,r 9,307 P.3d 677 (citing 
and quoting Prinsburg State Bank). 
Unless a party shows by timely motion that the stipulation was "entered 
into inadvertently" or that it should be set aside II for justifiable cause," the 
stipulation will be enforced. Prinsburg State Bank, 2012 UT 94, ,r 14; Beckstrom, 
2013 UT App 186, ,r 11. The Western States defendants made no such showing 
below. They did not move to set aside the stipulation at all, let alone on a timely 
basis. Instead, they allowed the Fullers to rely on the stipulation, withdraw 
Instruction No. 29, submit the case to the jury, obtain a verdict, and move for 
entry of judgment based on the verdict, all in reliance on the stipulation and 
prior court ruling. At that point, they then opposed the entry of judgment based 
on what should have been the settled issue of the rate, not by moving to set 
aside the stipulation but rather by arguing they had never entered into the 
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stipulation. (R. 1763-65.) They failed to meet the criteria set forth by both of this 
State's appellate courts that must be met before a party can get out of a binding 
stipulation. 
The 10% interest rate was "necessarily included in the stipulation" and 
therefore conclusive of the issue. The rate had already been settled by 
stipulation and order. The parties were merely adjusting the manner by which 
the stipulated rate would be implemented. There was absolutely no discussion 
about using a different rate, undoing the prior stipulation with a new 
stipulation, or throwing the matter back open for debate and possible different 
outcome. Had there been, the Fullers would never have agreed to it. As it 
stands, Western States subsequently played fast and loose with the stipulation, 
taking advantage of the circumstances to seek and obtain a different result. This 
was at the expense of the Fullers, who engaged honestly and openly in a 
discussion about a requested procedural change to awarding prejudgment 
interest- not a substantive change to the award - only to be told by the district 
court thereafter that they had lost substantial ground as a result.4 This Court 
should reverse that error, which was an abuse of the district court's discretion 
under the circumstances here presented. The lower court's failure to 
acknowledge or apply the Pringsburg/ Beckstrom criteria for enforcing a 
4 The defendants' bait-and-switch approach cost the Fullers approximately one-
third the value of the total judgment. (R. 1745-46, 1750-51, 1950-51.) 
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stipulation exceeded the permitted range of discretion. See Wilson v. IHC 
Hospitals, Inc., 2012 UT 43, ~ 52 n.15, 289 P.3d 369 ("Atrial court abuses its 
discretion if it commits legal error."); Rivera ex rel. Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 2000 UT 36, ~ 7 n.2, 1 P.3d 539 (a trial court abuses its discretion if its 
ruling II exceeded the range of discretion allowed for the particular act under 
review").5 
Despite the Fullers' earnest attempts to enforce the stipulation, the trial 
judge waxed and waned on how clearly he could remember the substance of the 
stipulation at the time he was initially called upon to enter a final judgment.6 
The court first thought it was clear: "I have a specific recollection of sitting here 
as we were going through that, that it struck me that there was a stipulation, 
and that I was a little surprised, actually, Mr. Barrett, that that wasn't - that you 
were just saying, fine, it applies to everything." (R. 1971, at 14-15.) 
Notwithstanding this "specific recollection," the court subsequently ruled that 
there had been no absolute stipulation on prejudgment interest. (R. 1795-96.) 
Three weeks later, the court suggested it had listened to a portion of the trial 
recording and recognized there had in fact been a stipulation (R. 1973, at 1-12), 
5 11 Abuse of discretion" does not imply that the trial court intentionally violated 
applicable standards, see Rivera, 2000 UT 36, ~ 7 n.2, and the Fullers do not 
suggest any such thing here. 
6 No written transcript had yet been made of the proceedings, so the judge was 
working from memory, aided by the briefing of the parties and the digital 
recording from the trial. (R. 1795-96; 1971, at 14-15; 1973, at 1-12.) 
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but failed to comprehend and implement the totality of the stipulation. This was 
reversible error. 
The Fullers had diligently worked jointly with Western States before trial 
even began to agree to the substance of stipulated jury instructions, and the 
prejudgment rate had been a settled issue by the first trial day. (R. 1318, 1599, 
1631.) The district court specifically approved the rate, both when approving the 
jury instruction (R. 1702; 1969, at 70) and again when approving the stipulation: 
"[I]t's a simple calculation, ... it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it in 
your head .... [T]he amount is fine." (R. 1969, at 73.) The 10% rate issue was 
"settled" and "not reserved for future consideration." Prinsburg State Bank v. 
Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ,r 14,296 P.3d 709. Western States' "admission" was 
"binding," and the Western States defendants should have been "estopped" 
from challenging the issue further. See id. ,r 13. 
Third, Western States failed to timely object to the use of the 10% rate at 
the time of the stipulation. This Court should reject the belated objection to the 
10% rate. If the Western States defendants believed the effect of their stipulation 
was something other than what the court said it was - "a 10 percent calculation 
and you can do it in your head" - they had the obligation to raise a timely 
objection at that point. See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,r 51, 99 
P.3d 801. They did not. Instead, their silence equaled consent and they waived 
any objection after the Fullers relied on their agreement - even though the 
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district court later agreed to revisit the issue. Cf United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 
1279, 1309-10 (10th Cir. 2009) (untimely objection insufficient even if raised 
subsequently in district court). 
On this record, and given the governing law, the district court abused its 
discretion by undoing the waiver to the substance of the initial instruction, 
refusing to fully enforce the stipulation, and ignoring the waiver of the use of 
the articulated rate. This Court should reverse the imposition by the district 
court of any rate other than the 10% rate agreed to by the parties. The Court 
should remand the case to the district court with instructions to enter an 
amended judgment containing a prejudgment interest rate of 10%. The Court 
need not reach the second or third issues in this brief. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY REFUSED TO USE THE 
LEGAL RATE FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST OF 10%. 
If for whatever reason this Court does not recognize the Western States 
defendants' waiver of a challenge to the 10% rate or enforce the parties' 
stipulation as agreed, the Court should nevertheless hold that the 10% legal rate 
is the appropriate prejudgment rate required to be used here. 
A. The District Court Incorrectly Failed to Apply the Governing 
Rule from Fell v. Union Pacific RR and Uinta Pipeline Corp. 
The district court's failure to apply the 10% legal rate in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 15-1-1(2) ignores and conflicts with controlling precedent. See Fell v. Union Pac. 
RR, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 1907); Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 
27 
Q 
P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1976). This Court's own recent case law suggests the 
statute applies when awarding prejudgment interest for a "chose in action" in 
the absence of a contrary agreement. See Sundial Inc. v. Villages at Wolf Hollow 
Condo. Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 2013 UT App 223, 'if 8,310 P.3d 1233. This is but 
one in a long line of cases correctly interpreting this statute. These and related 
cases will be discussed further herein. 
The statute reads as follows: 
Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2). This Court "look[s] first to the plain meaning of the 
statute and then review[s] [the] district court's interpretation of a statute for 
correctness." Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT App 119, 'if 21,350 P.3d 615 
(citation and quotations omitted). 
Section 15-1-1(2) embodies the "legal rate" of interest. Sundial, 2013 UT 
App 223, 'if 8. This section or its substantively similar predecessors have been in 
place in Utah since the late 1800s. See Fell v. Union Pac. RR, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 
1907) (citing Revised Statutes§ 1241 (1898)); Addend. Ex. 9 (tracing statute's 
history from 1898 to the present).7 
7 Pre-1953 versions of the statute were obtained electronically from the Utah 
Government Digital Library (digitaUibrary.utah.gov) through the portal of the 
Utah Courts website (utcg_urts.gov /!<!~_library/ research/ utah.a~p). For a history 
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From the beginning, the Supreme Court has held that the statute "is 
general, allowing interest in all cases at the legal rate, in the absence of an 
agreement" if prejudgment interest is to be awarded. Fell, 88 P. at 1007. Over 
time, the rate within the statute has changed, but the substance and application 
have remained consistently the same. See Uinta Pipeline, 546 P.2d at 887 (noting 
the "landmark" Fell case "has been followed in Utah many times"). The most 
recent rate change went from 6% to 10% effective May 14, 1981. See SCM Land 
Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108-09 (Utah 1986); Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-
1(3); Addend. Ex. 9, at 13-14. 
In the Sundial decision, this Court followed the longstanding 
interpretation of this jurisdiction in reading the statute to mean that unless 
parties stipulate to a different rate of interest by contract, the statutory rate of 
10% set forth in Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 applies to the forbearance of monies 
owed on a "chose in action." See Sundial, 2013 UT App 223, ,r 8. Specifically, the 
Court's plain-language interpretation of the statute is that "'the legal rate of 
[prejudgment] interest for ... any ... chose in action shall be 10% per annum."' Id. 
(quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2)). 
A "chose in action" is '"a claim or debt upon which a recovery may be 
made in a lawsuit."' Id. (quoting Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 
of territorial laws on interest, see Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 compiler's note, 
attached as Addendum Exhibit 9, at 12. 
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UT 49, ,r 9,980 P.2d 208 (quoting Barron's Law DictionanJ 71 (3d ed. 1991))). The 
negligence-based tort claims in this case are undoubtedly choses in action, as 
was the unjust enrichment claim advanced in Sundial. (R. 1233, 1235, 1733-34.) 
The "legal rate" prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 is therefore the rate to be 
used when awarding prejudgment interest in such matters, unless the parties 
agree to a different rate. See, e.g., Fell v. Union Pac. RR, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 
1907) (prejudgment interest at statutory legal rate awarded in negligence case 
resulting in damage to property); Error v. Western Home Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1077, 
1080 (Utah 1988) (noting prejudgment interest of 10% awarded by trial court on 
damages and expenses for rebuilding home after insurer failed to pay policy 
coverage for fire); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 
308 (Utah 1983) (prejudgment interest at agreed contract rate of 10% awarded on 
negligent misrepresentation claim); Vali Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of 
Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438,445 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting Section§ 15-1-1 
establishes the rate if a plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest). 
The rule identified by this Court in Sundial traces its roots back to the 
Supreme Court's seminal decision in Fell v. Union Pacific RR, 88 P. 1003 (Utah 
1907). Fell was an action filed against a railroad for damage to livestock. The 
defendant's negligence caused the death of certain sheep in transit and the 
shrinkage in weight of others. See id. at 1003. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court judge in concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover 
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prejudgment interest. See id. at 1005-07. The Court then concluded that 
prejudgment interest was properly awarded at the statutory legal rate on 
property damages caused by negligence. See id. The Court observed that "[o]ur 
statute (section 1241, Rev. St. 1898) is general, allowing interest in all cases at the 
legal rate, in the absence of an agreement." Id. at 1007. 
In 1922, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he doctrine laid down in [Fell 
and related case Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 90 P. 395 (Utah 1907)] has been the law 
of this jurisdiction for more than 15 years, and has been followed many times by 
this court. Both the bench and the bar of this state should therefore be well 
acquainted with those decisions and should regard the question as settled." 
Bingham Coal & Lumber Co. v. Board of Educ., 211 P. 981,984 (Utah 1922). By the 
time of its decision in Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 
(Utah 1976), the Court observed that the "landmark" Fell case "ha[d] been 
followed in Utah many times." Uinta Pipeline, 546 P.2d at 887 (collecting cases).8 
8 See, e.g., Kimball v. Salt Lake CihJ, 90 P. 395, 397 (Utah 1907) (awarding 
prejudgment interest at the legal rate for damage to real property); San Pedro, 
L.A. & S.L.R. Co. v. Board of Educ., 99 P. 263,267 (Utah 1909) (damage to real 
property); Wheatley v. Oregon Short Line RR, 162 P. 86, 87 (Utah 1916) (damage to 
personal property); Wilson v. Salt Lake CihJ, 174 P. 847, 850-51 (Utah 1918) 
(quantum meruit); Baker Lumber Co. v. A.A. Clark Co., 178 P. 764, 770-71 (Utah 
1919) (municipal obligation); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 195 P. 305,311 
(Utah 1921) (wrongful attachment); Bingham Coal & Lumber Co. v. Board of Educ., 
211 P. 981,984 (Utah 1922) (breach of contract); Gillespie v. Blood, 17 P.2d 822,825 
(Utah 1932) (action on recovery of bonds). 
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In the 1976 decision of Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 
885 (Utah 1976), the plaintiff sued after the defendant's negligent conduct 
resulted in property damages. See id. at 886. The Supreme Court affirmed a jury 
verdict for the plaintiff, then turned to the question of prejudgment interest on 
the award. See id. at 886-87. Citing Fell, the Court observed that "prejudgment 
interest is allowable for the destruction or damage to personal property." Id. at 
887. After concluding the plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest on the 
award, the Court "remanded with directions to increase the amount of 
judgment by the amount of interest accrued from date of damage to date of 
judgment calculated at the legal rate." Id. at 888 (emphasis added). The rule in 
Fell and Uinta Pipeline has continued to be followed since and remains good law 
down to the present day.9 
9 See, e.g., Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1976) (citing 
Uinta Pipeline and Fell in awarding prejudgment interest for breach of contract 
"in conformity with the prior decisions of this court"); Bjork v. Apr. Indus., Inc., 
560 P.2d 315,317 (Utah 1977) (breach of contract); Anderson v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 583 P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978) (breach of insurance contract); Lignell v. 
Berg, 593 P.2d 800,809 (Utah 1979) (breach of contract); Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414,422 (Utah 1989) (lost profits; prejudgment interest denied 
under Fell test) ("This Court has repeatedly stated the law in Utah as it applies 
to prejudgment interest"); Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1226 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (damage to real property; prejudgment interest denied 
under Fell test); Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, ,r 24,994 P.2d 817 (tort and 
contract claims); Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201, ,r,r 64, 90, 71 P.3d 
188 (breach of contract; remanding for imposition of prejudgment interest at the 
"appropriate statutory rates"); Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ,r 17, 82 
P.3d 1064 (tort and contract claims); Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 
2009 UT 7, ,r,r 50-55, 210 P.3d 263 (breach of contract); Stevensen 3rd E., LC v. 
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Under the Fell decision and its considerable progeny, the" general statute" 
now codified as Section 15-1-1 provides the "legal rate" to apply when awarding 
prejudgment interest if the parties have not otherwise agreed to a different rate. 
See Fell, 88 P. at 1007; Sundial, 2013 UT App 223, ,r 8. The statute has consistently 
been interpreted this way. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State 
Lands & ForestnJ, 886 P.2d 514,529 (Utah 1994) (Bench, J., concurring and 
dissenting) ("Utah law establishes the rate of prejudgment interest '[e]xcept 
when parties to a lawful contract agree on a specified rate"') (quoting Utah 
Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 (1992)) (additional citation and quotation omitted), abrogated 
on other grounds by State ex rel. Sch. & Institutional Trust Land Admin. v. Mathis, 
2009 UT 85,223 P.3d 1119. Simply put, Section 15-1-1 is" applicable to 
prejudgment interest generally." Id. (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). 
Indeed, the district court in the instant case referred to Section 15-1-1 as the 
"prejudgment interest statute," and the Western States defendants conceded 
below the predicate that "prejudgment interest may be awarded in negligence 
actions to recover for damages to property." (R. 1795 n.4.) This Court holds that 
once that predicate is established, the legal rate applies. See Vali Convalescent & 
Care Ins ts. v. Division of Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438,445 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
Watts, 2009 UT App 137, ,I 55, 210 P.3d 977, 991 (breach of fiduciary duty; 
prejudgment interest denied under Fell test). 
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(noting if plaintiff "is entitled to interest on some valid basis§ 15-1-1 establishes 
the rate of interest to which it is entitled).10 
This Court should apply the 10% rate in Section 15-1-1(2). It applies on its 
face. It applies per Fell and Uinta Pipeline and a host of other decisions. It applies 
also because the parties specifically agreed to use a 10% interest rate for these 
choses in action in their court-approved stipulation - which is a "lawful 
contract" whereby they agreed to a specified rate. See Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-
1(2) ("Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest ... "); 
Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ,i 13,296 P.3d 709 (referring to a 
stipulation between litigants as an enforceable" contract"); Sllpra Part I. The 
district court's refusal to use the statutory legal rate is reversible error under the 
law and the facts of this case. 
B. The District Court Incorrectly Looked to Inapposite Cases. 
As noted, the Fell line of decisions applying the legal rate as the 
prejudgment interest rate has been the law in Utah since 1907. This Court has 
continued that line of decisions by looking to the statutory 10% rate in Utah 
10 The Fell rule applies to property damage cases caused by negligence, but not 
to personal injury cases. See Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 
1976) (reciting the common law rule prohibiting prejudgment interest in 
personal injury cases). The Utah Legislature statutorily abrogated the common 
law prohibition against prejudgment interest for personal injury damages by 
enacting legislation now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-824. That section 
authorizes prejudgment interest on personal injury judgments and sets a special 
calculable rate that currently may not exceed 10%. No party to this case has 
argued that Section 78B-5-824 applies here. 
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Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2) as the applicable legal rate for prejudgment interest on 
choses in action such as those in this case. The district court's decision would 
break the line of cases and call into question the framework for awarding 
prejudgment interest in Utah. This Court should put a halt to any such 
attempted diversion. 
1. Supreme Court language from other contexts does not govern. 
The district judge apparently hesitated to follow the Fell decision because 
of "individualized dicta" from one Supreme Court case that was later invoked 
in a second Supreme Court case dealing with prejudgment interest for statutory 
damages. (R. 1973, at 13-16.) The holdings from those cases do not control the 
circumstances here, and neither should any dicta expressed therein. 
To understand that dicta, this Court needs to understand the two 
Supreme Court cases invoked (Consolidation Coal and Wilcox); a Supreme Court 
precursor to those two cases (SCM Land); and a decision by this Court from 
earlier this year discussing the Supreme Court's case law in context (National 
DME). Each will be discussed next, in chronological order. 
In SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986), the Supreme 
Court used the legal rate in Section 15-1-1 to add prejudgment interest to an 
award for breach of a lease agreement. See id. at 108-09. The dispute in the case 
was whether to apply Section 15-1-l's statutory interest rate in effect at the time 
of the breach (10%) or in effect at the time the contract was entered (6% ). See id. 
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There was no dispute, however, whether Section 15-1-1 supplied the proper 
prejudgment rate. The Court determined that the rate in effect at the time the 
contract was entered was the proper one and ruled accordingly. See id. at 109. 
Next, in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands & ForestnJ, 886 
P.2d 514 (Utah 1994), abrogated by State ex rel. Sch. & Institutional Trust Land 
Admin. v. Mathis, 2009 UT 85,223 P.3d 1119, the Supreme Court determined that 
a higher rate than the statutory legal rate should apply to a coal consortium's 
breach of a lease agreement with the State's School & Institutional Trust Land 
Administration. Instead of applying Section 15-1-l's then-prevailing statutory 
legal rate of 6%, the Court instead applied a rate prescribed by State regulations 
governing the use of State lands, which went as high as 15 % . See Consolidation 
Coal, 886 P.2d at 524-25 & n.15. The Court reached its decision based on "the 
specific constitutional requirement that the State obtain full value for its school 
trust lands, in conjunction with the legislature's broad grant of authority to the 
[State] and our case law indicating that the [State] has such further implied 
powers as are reasonably necessary to carry out its constitutional duties." Id. at 
527. The Court further noted that the terms of the lease made it "expressly 
subject to the laws of Utah," including the State interest rate regulations upon 
which the Court relied. Id. at 528. 
While writing for the majority in Consolidation Coal, Chief Justice 
Zimmerman dropped a footnote in which he expressed in dicta a personal view 
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that the legal rate in Section 15-1-1 should not apply as the prejudgment rate in 
all breach of contract matters, which he thought the Court's SCM Land decision 
had seemed implicitly to suggest and which he found to be reflected as well in 
Court of Appeals jurisprudence: 
The author of this opinion has serious reservations about the initial 
correctness and therefore the continued vitality of SCM Land and any 
other case that purports to tie prejudgment interest rates in all contract 
cases to the section 15-1-1 rate in effect at the time the contract was signed. 
See, e.g., Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 731-32 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). The plain language of section 15-1-1 seems to indicate that the 
section was intended to apply only to a "loan or forbearance" of "money, 
goods or chose in action." Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1. In other words, it 
provides a default interest rate when the parties have failed to specify an 
interest rate for "the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in 
action that is the subject of their contract." Id. The subject of the present 
contract is the sale of mineral rights, not a loan or forbearance. This was 
also the case in SCM Land. That opinion adopted its view of section 15-1-
1' s applicability without discussing the limiting language of that section. 
Nevertheless, because the State has failed to raise this issue and its 
resolution is not necessary for a disposition of this case, we decline to 
address it. 
Consolidation Coal Co, 886 P.2d at 525 n.13. 
Judge Bench from this Court, sitting by designation in Consolidation Coal, 
filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in which he challenged what he called 
Justice Zimmerman's "individualized dicta" as contrary to established case law 
in Utah: 
Chief Justice Zimmerman's individualized dicta attacking this well-
established line of cases is unfounded. Justice Zimmerman suggests that 
because the contracts were for the sale of goods (mineral rights), they are 
not a "loan or forbearance." Justice Zimmerman misapprehends the 
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purpose of section 15-1-1 and prejudgment interest. Prejudgment interest 
is designed to compensate the nonbreaching party that finds itself, by 
virtue of the breach, in the position of loaning money or forbearing what 
is owed by the breaching party. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages§ 82 (1988); see 
also L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626, 630 (Utah 
1980) (prejudgment interest represents interest on amount awarded as 
damages due to party's failure or delay in paying amount under contract); 
Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301,304 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (prejudgment 
interest is that interest owed on overdue debt from date debt became 
overdue until entry of judgment). Therefore, because of the 
underpayment of royalties by Consol, the State found itself in the position 
of loaning or forbearing money it was owed. 
Id. at 529 n.1 (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Bench also pointed 
out that "Utah law establishes the rate of prejudgment interest '[e]xcept when 
parties to a lawful conh·act agree on a specified rate."' Id. at 529 (Bench, J., 
concurring and dissenting) ( quoting Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Division of State 
Lands & ForestnJ, 884 P.2d 1265, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), aff din part, rev' din 
part, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996), (quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 (1992)). He 
further noted that Section 15-1-1 is" applicable to prejudgment interest 
generally." Id. ((Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). 
Then, in Wilcox ·u. Anchor Wate, 2007 UT 39, 164 P.3d 353, the Supreme 
Court determined Section 15-1-l's legal rate did not apply to a statutory 
voidable preference recovery. The liquidator of an insolvent insurance company 
sued under the Utah Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act (the 
"Liquidation Act") to void a preferential $3.5 million payment. See id. 1 1. The 
Liquidation Act did "not specify the rate of prejudgment interest applicable to 
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judgment obtained under its voidable preference provisions." Id. ,r 42. The 
Court held that, "when filling in gaps or interpreting ambiguous provisions of 
the Liquidation Act, we look to the preference provisions of federal bankruptcy 
law, which have the same purpose as the preference provisions of the 
Liquidation Act." Id. ,I 47; see also id. ,I 11 (noting same). The Court therefore 
concluded that, "when calculating the prejudgment interest on remand, the 
district court should use the rate applied by the majority of federal courts to 
judgments obtained in federal preference actions." Id. ,I 47. The rate used by the 
majority of federal courts in that instance was the federal post-judgment interest 
rate. See id. ,I 47 n.55 (collecting cases). 
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the 
10% legal rate in Section 15-1-1(2) to voidable preference actions under the 
Liquidation Act. See id. iliI 42-46. The Court looked to Justice Zimmerman's 
individualized dicta in Consolidation Coal to do so: 
The theoretical underpinning behind section 15-1-1 is that the parties to a 
lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of money, goods, or causes of action that are the subject of 
their contract. Only when the parties to a contract fail to specify a rate of 
interest does the default rate specified in section 15-1-1(2) apply. But this 
case is not a conh·act action. There was no contract between Anchor Wate 
and the Liquidator and therefore no opportunity for the parties to agree 
upon an applicable rate of interest. The Liquidator's judgment is not 
grounded on any voluntary undertaking by Anchor Wate. Rather, it is the 
result of the statutory power given the Liquidator as he attempts to fulfill 
his statutory mandate of achieving an equitable distribution of SAIC' s 
estate. And there is nothing to suggest that the default interest rate 
specified in section 15-1-1(2) is consistent with this statutory mandate. 
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This court has previously expressed the view that the interest rate 
specified in section 15-1-1(2) does not necessarily even apply in all 
contract cases. In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Dfr.,ision of State Lands & 
Forestry, we suggested, albeit in dicta, that we had "serious reservations 
about ... [cases] that purport[] to tie prejudgment interest rates in all 
contract cases to the section 15-1-1 rate" because this section was meant to 
apply only to loans or forebearances in contract actions . 
Just as the default rate specified in section 15-1-1(2) does not 
automatically extend to all judgments obtained in contract cases, it does 
not automatically apply to all judgments based on statute where the 
legislature has failed to specify the applicable rate. And in this case, we 
conclude that the more appropriate prejudgment interest rate is the one 
applicable to preference claims under federal bankruptcy law. 
Id. ,r,r 44-46. The Court found good policy reasons for its approach in the context 
of the Liquidation Act's statutory voidable preference action: 
Application of the federal rate will adequately compensate the estates of 
insolvent insurers for the time value of money without creating an 
incentive for insurance liquidators to delay prosecution of voidable 
preference claims in order to obtain returns greater than they could have 
reasonably expected to earn in the market. It will also more adequately 
take into account the practical reality of defendants in preference actions 
that, like Anchor Wate, dispose of the proceeds obtained from the estate 
of the insolvent insurer in the ordinary course of business prior to the 
liquidation of the insurer or the initiation of a preference claim by the 
Liquidator. Such defendants lack the ability to invest the proceeds at all. 
Under such circumstances, application of the default rate specified in 
section 15-1-l(s) could be entirely punitive and, in fact, may unjustly 
enrich other creditors at the expense of the preference defendant. In the 
event that the Utah legislature prefers a rate of interest different from the 
federal rate, it may amend the Liquidation Act to specify the applicable 
rate. 
Id. ,r 48. 
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Most recently, in an opinion handed down earlier this year, Francis v. 
National DME, 2015 UT App 119,350 P.3d 615, this Court recognized the 
intersection of argument based on the Consolidation Coal/Wilcox dicta with the 
holdings of Sundial and its predecessors. See id. iJil 39-42. In National DME, the 
trial court awarded 10% prejudgment interest under Section 15-1-1 for breach of 
contract. See id. ,I 18. This Court affirmed. See id. ,I 44. However, because of 
inadequate briefing by the appellant, the Court did not resolve the alleged 
competing interpretations of Section 15-1-1 based on Consolidated Coal/Wilcox, 
Judge Bench's concurring and dissenting opinion in Consolidated Coal, and the 
Sundial line of cases. See id. But in affirming the 10% award, the Court made 
several observations that obtain here. 
First, the Court noted that its recitation of Section 15-1-l's language in 
Sundial "implies that choses of action qualify for the statutory rate regardless of 
whether a loan or forbearance is involved." Id. ,I 41. The Court suggested that 
under this interpretation, '"loan or forbearance' applies only to the word 
'money."' Id. That is the interpretation reflected in the Fell line of cases from 
1907 forward, including the 2013 Sundial opinion. 
Second, the Court observed that, although the question presented in 
National DME was not presented to other courts, "section 15-1-1 has been 
applied in other cases involving a chose in action instead of a loan or 
forbearance." Id. (citing Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, 
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,r,r 50-55 & n.20, 210 P.3d 263 (affirming the trial court's application of section 
15-1-1 to a breach of contract claim); Mont Trucking, Inc. v. Entrada Indus., Inc., 
802 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 
301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (same)); see also id. ,r 43 ("The question of whether 
an action must specifically be a 'loan or forbearance' was not at issue in either 
Consolidation Coal or Sundial."). 
Third, this Court observed: "We have found no case that squarely 
addresses the correct interpretation of the phrase 'loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action."' Id. ,r 43 (quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-
1(2)). The Court likewise found no need to do so in National DME, and so 
affirmed the trial court's imposition of a 10% statutory rate in that case. See id. 
,r 44. 
If this Court reaches the question, it should hold to the Sundial reading of 
the statute: '"the legal rate of [prejudgment] interest for ... any ... chose in 
action shall be 10% per annum.'" Sundial, 2013 UT App 223, ,r 8 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2)). The failure of a tortfeasor to timely compensate a 
plaintiff for losses incurred is analogous to the loan or forbearance of money in a 
contract case. As Judge Bench observed with respect to a contract breach, 
"[p ]rejudgment interest is designed to compensate the nonbreaching party that 
finds itself, by virtue of the breach, in the position of loaning money or 
forbearing what is owed by the breaching party." Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d at 
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529 n.1 (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). The same rationale applies to 
someone who is owed fixed property damages as a result of a tort. By delaying 
payment on an amount calculable by facts and figures, the tortfeasor is 
obtaining the benefit of the plaintiff's money as if it were a loan or in the nature 
of forbearance on money owed. The interest rate in Section 15-1-1 applies to all 
such forbearance "[e]xcept when parties to a lawful contract agree on a specified 
rate." Id. at 529 (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations and quotations 
omitted); see also Iron Head Constr. Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, iJ 10, 207 P.3d 1231 
(noting prejudgment interest" serves to compensate a party for the depreciating 
value of the amount owed over time," which "would have been paid to 
plaintiffs" in satisfaction of their claim but for the defendants' breach of duty) 
(citations omitted). 
In addition to the compelling points set forth in the analysis from Judge 
Bench in Consolidation Coal, from this Court in Sundial, and from this Court again 
in National DME, the Supreme Court's asides in Consolidation Coal and Wilcox are 
readily and persuasively distinguished. 
First, Justice Zimmerman's personal view, expressed in obiter dicta, was 
just that. It was not a holding and did not purport even to express the view of a 
majority of the Court. It was offered up without briefing or argument from 
either side, and it failed to take into consideration Fell or its substantial 
subsequent history and application. As Judge Bench pointed out in his 
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dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman's musings were directly 
contrary to long-established Utah law and misapprehended the nature and 
purpose of the prejudgment interest statute. See Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d at 
529 n.1 (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). His view carries little weight here. 
Second, Consolidation Coal itself was unique. The Court concluded that the 
then-prevailing statutory legal rate of 6% was insufficient given the State's 
constitutional and statutory mandates to obtain "full value" from its lands. See 
Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d at 527. The Court thus felt compelled by what it 
found to be different controlling law to use a higher rate. See id. at 524-25 & n.15. 
Since the time it was first handed down, Consolidation Coal itself has been 
abrogated, rendering it even more unhelpful to the discussion here. See State ex 
rel. Sch. & Institutional Trust Land Admin. v. Mathis, 2009 UT 85,223 P.3d 1119. 
Third, like Consolidation Coal, the Wilcox case was a policy-driven decision 
implementing a remedial statutory mandate and statutory goals. On the 
strength of its own established authority, the Court's interpretation of the 
Liquidation Act looked to federal bankruptcy law rather than to Section 15-1-1. 
See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, ,r,r 11, 47. The Court relied heavily on the substantial 
policy reasons behind using the federal post-judgment interest rate as a majority 
of federal bankruptcy courts did. See id. ,r,r 47-48. Wilcox did not involve a tort 
chose in action, let alone a negligence claim involving property damages like 
Fell or Uinta Pipeline. 
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Fourth, Wilcox bent the Co11solidation Coal dicta to its own purposes. In 
doing so, the Court arguably stretched the earlier case's gratuitous statements 
beyond acceptable tolerance limits. The Supreme Court recognized Justice 
Zimmerman's observations in Consolidation Coal as obiter dicta but then applied 
them as if they were holding. See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, if if 45-46. The problem 
with this approach is that the individualized dicta was unbriefed and untested 
in the first instance. It was not the law of the land and should not have been 
when appropriated by the Wilcox Court. As this Court correctly recognized in 
National DME, the Supreme Court has not been squarely presented with the 
question presented here. See National DME, 2015 UT App 119, ,r 41. The Court in 
Wilcox was not - that case was a statutory claim that lent no discussion at all to 
common law choses in action. See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, ,r,r 42-48. In fact, two 
years after Wilcox the Supreme Court affirmed an award of 10% prejudgment 
interest using the h·aditional application of Section 1.5-1-1. See Encon Utah, LLC v. 
Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ,r,r 50-55 & n.20, 210 P.3d 263. 
Lastly - and perhaps most importantly - neither of the Supreme Court 
cases containing equivocal language purported to overrule Fell or Uinta Pipeline, 
or even address them. Those cases remain controlling law and dictate the result 
here. The doctrine of stare decisis required the district court to follow binding 
appellate precedent, and its failure to do so here calls for correction of error. See 
Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, iJ 20 & n.3, 345 P.3d 553. 
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If the Court needs to reach this issue, the Court should conclude that the 
statutory legal rate applies to prejudgment interest on this property damage 
award. That was the holding of Fell, which has never been overruled. That is the 
result in a long line of cases since Fell, including case law that post-dates Wilcox. 
That is the correct holding here. 
2. Federal court cases do not govern. 
In their supplemental briefing below, the Western States defendants 
argued that, besides the Consolidation Coal/Wilcox pairing, "[o]ther Utah courts" 
have declined to apply Section 15-1-l's rate to prejudgment interest in non-
contract settings. (R. 1808.) Western States then cited, not to Utah courts at all, 
but rather to federal courts exercising discretionary prerogative in setting a 
prejudgment interest rate under federal case law. (R. 1808.) 
The Western States defendants pointed to Judge Waddoups' short 
Memorandum Decision and Order in Klein v. Patterson, No. 2:11-cv-723-CW, 
2013 WL 5445949 (D. Utah, Sept. 30, 2013) (unpublished). Patterson was a 
fraudulent transfer action in which the court-appointed receiver recovered a 
judgment against a third party. See id. at *1. Judge Waddoups first awarded 
prejudgment interest under Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2) based on the receiver's 
oral suggestion that "the section applies not just to contracts, but more broadly 
to a chose in action." Id. He then reversed himself and ruled that "[w]hile the 
statute does refer to a chose in action, it does so within the context of" a lawful 
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contract." Id. The judge decided that a fraudulent transfer is not within the 
realm of contract law, and he found no other Utah statute or federal law 
providing a prejudgment interest rate for a fraudulent transfer judgment. See id. 
Consequently, he relied on a prior Tenth Circuit receivership decision 
ruling that "the prejudgment interest 'calculation rests firmly within the sound 
discretion of the trial court."' Id. (citing Wing v. Gillis, No. 12-4071, 2013 
U.S.App. LEXIS 10174, at *16, 2013 WL 2169321, 525 Fed. Appx. 795 (10th Cir. 
May 21, 2013) (unpublished)). The Tenth Circuit's Order and Judgment in Gillis 
had ruled that prejudgment interest was proper in a fraudulent transfer case 
"[u]nder fairness and equity principles" because it "compensates for the loss of 
use of the money" and avoids '"a windfall [to the defendant] in the form of an 
interest-free loan."' Gillis, 525 Fed. Appx. at 801 ( quoting William A. Graham Co. 
v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 145 (3rd Cir. 2011)). Following the Tenth Circuit's lead, 
Judge Waddoups used a 5% rate, which Gillis ruled was a matter of discretion 
because there was "no federal statute setting forth an appropriate rate of 
prejudgment interest." See Patterson, supra, at *2; Gillis, 525 Fed. Appx. at 801. 
These two unpublished federal decisions are not binding upon this Court. 
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit's Order and Judgment is not even binding precedent 
in the Tenth Circuit. See Gillis, supra, at footnote "*". More importantly, though, 
they are not persuasive. Judge Waddoups apparently ruled without the benefit 
of briefing from the parties. He did not cite to Fell, Uinta Pipeline, or any state 
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court case law. He did not consider the holdings of any Utah appellate court. 
Instead, he latched onto language from Gillis that the rate was a matter of 
discretion. 
Unfortunately, the law in Gillis got lost in translation. (This is perhaps 
why unpublished orders and judgment are not binding precedent.) Gillis itself 
had cited to the published decision of Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Ground 
Improvement Techniques, Inc., 532 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008). See Gillis, 525 Fed. 
Appx. at 801. That case held quite clearly that "the law governing compensatory 
damages also governs prejudgment interest." Morrison Knudsen, 532 at 1077 
(rejecting the "'smorgasbord approach' created by allowing parties to pick and 
choose prejudgment interest law") (citing Johnson v. Cont'l Airlines Corp., 964 
F.2d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir. 1992)). Thus, Utah law, not federal law, determines the 
applicable rate for prejudgment interest under a Utah state law cause of action. 
Now here does Utah law suggest that the awarding of prejudgment interest or 
the application of the proper rate for state common law choses in action is a 
matter of equitable discretion or of federal law. 
To the contrary, the Tenth Circuit has previously recognized the viability 
of the Uinta Pipeline/ Fell line of cases in determining prejudgment interest under 
Utah law. See U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1255 (10th Cir. 
1988), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 
77 F.3d 1215, 1231 (10th Cir. 1996). As already briefed at length, those Utah cases 
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hold that the "legal rate" applies. See supra Part II.A. The "legal rate" is found in 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). See Sundial, 2013 UT App 223, ,r 8. 
If this Court is nevertheless persuaded by the two unpublished federal 
decisions the Western States defendants cited, then the Court should use a 10% 
rate as a matter of equitable discretion. There is authority for this approach as 
well in the federal court case law. See Krum v. Hartford Life & Acc. Co., 942 F. 
Supp. 2d 1171, 1186 (D. Utah 2013) (Shelby, J.) (awarding prejudgment interest 
of 10% for improperly denied ERISA benefits under Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1). 
Moreover, the equities of this case call for it. This case would have been over 
long ago if the Western States defendants had stuck to their prior agreements 
made on the record. Their bait-and-switch argument was a litigation tactic that 
added insult to the Fullers' injuries already suffered at their hands. The Fullers 
are now going on their ninth year of seeking redress for the harm caused by 
Denise Bohne and Western States. The equities point to using the rate that was 
originally agreed to by the parties, which the Western States defendants 
subsequently wriggled out of by their legal maneuvering. See also infra Part III 
( discussing appropriate rates in the event court discretion is invoked). 
3. A statute granting equitable discretion does not govem. 
The other "Utah court" the Western States defendants pointed to below as 
using its discretion was this Court. (R. 1809.) Western States argued that in 
Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, ,r,r 56-58, 253 P.3d 1096, this Court 
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• 
"affirmed the trial court's equitable decision to use the post-judgment rate in 
§ 15-1-4 to calculate prejudgment interest in the statutory dissolution of a 
privately held corporation." (R. 1809.) However, the statute at issue in Peterson, 
Utah Code Ann.§ 16-l0a-1434, specifically provided that prejudgment interest 
"may be allowed at the rate and from the date determined by the court to be 
equitable." This Court therefore affirmed the use of the post-judgment rate in 
Section 15-1-4 as "rational" and not an abuse of discretion. Id. ,r 58. No such 
statute exists here. Peterson does not stand for the broad proposition that Utah 
courts decide the prejudgment interest rate as a matter of equity for common 
law choses in action. The viable Fell decision and its progeny are decidedly to 
the contrary. 
In sum, this Court should reject the case law invoked that falls outside the 
contours of Fell and its progeny. Based on a correct application of the law, the 
Court should reverse. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY APPLYING 
THE 2015 POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATE TO PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST ACCRUING SINCE 2007.11 
Finally, if this Court rejects all of the Fullers' arguments to this point, the 
Court should nevertheless reverse and remand with instructions. The district 
11 This issue was preserved below by the Western States defendants' raising and 
arguing it and by the district court's ruling on it. See Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 
63, ,r 45,323 P.3d 998 (holding issues, not arguments, are preserved for appellate 
review); R. 1808-10; R. 1973, at 19-21. 
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court abused its discretion by applying the 2015 post-judgment interest rate to 
prejudgment interest accruing since 2007. The lower court gave no rationale for 
this decision; it simply announced it. (R. 1973, at 19-21.) This was an abuse of the 
court's discretion. See Johnston v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT App 179, ,i 15,307 P.3d 
615, cert. denied, 317 P.3d 432 (Utah 2013) (requiring a reasonable basis for a 
discretionary decision to be upheld on appeal, and noting remand is 
appropriate if one is not clear from the record). 
As already argued, the Court should have used the rate agreed to 
between the parties in the first place. See supra Part II.B.2. The Western States 
defendants' change of heart cost the Fullers additional time and expense and 
continues to do so. The most equitable rate to apply, if equitable discretion 
comes into play, would be the 10% rate stipulated to before trial began and 
again during the course of trial. The trial court exceeded its discretion when it 
went away from that rate under these circumstances. 
Alternatively, the district court's decision failed to take into account when 
the interest began running. The difference between interest rates in 2007 and 
2015 was substantial: in 2007 it was 6.99% per annum; in 2015 it was 2.27%.12 To 
apply the 2015 rate simply because that is when the judgment entered is wholly 
arbitrary. If prejudgment interest is to be applied using a post-judgment rate, it 
12 See Ji.tt12: // www. utcourts_~ov / resources;' it:i j:rate~Ljntercsb:ates.hbn. 
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should at least be the rate in effect at the time the prejudgment interest began 
running. 
The district court's ruling failed to appreciate that the purpose of 
awarding prejudgment interest is to replace what was lost in the interim period 
after the wrongful conduct or breach: 
"[A]n award of prejudgment interest simply serves to compensate a 
party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time and, as a 
corollary, deters parties from intentionally withholding an amount that is 
liquidated and owing." Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands 
& Forestn;, 921 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 1996). "Plaintiffs are entitled to 
damages for the loss of use of the money that, but for the [defendant]'s 
breach and ensuing delay, would have been paid to plaintiffs in 
satisfaction of their ... claim." Kraatz v. Heritage Imps., 2003 UT App 201, 
,r 75, 71 P.3d 188 (alterations in original) (citing Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 
939 P.2d 1204, 1212 (Utah Ct.App.1997)). 
Iron Head Constr. Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, ,r 10, 207 P.3d 1231. That cannot be 
accomplished in this case by using a low rate that came into effect years after the 
tortious conduct and bears no resemblance to market rates at the time. 
Even the cases Western States cited from the federal courts declined to use 
the post-judgment rate. See Patterson, supra; Gillis, supra. Each of those applied a 
5% rate as a "middle ground" between the positions taken by the litigants as a 
matter of fairness and equity. By failing to do the same here, the district judge 
below eschewed even the cases the Western States defendants presented to him. 
Lastly, the post-judgment interest rate used in the Wilcox decision was 
decided in that context as a matter of statutory interpretation by looking to 
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analogous federal bankruptcy law. See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, ,I,r 11, 47-48. If what 
the district court did here was follow Wilcox's lead on the appropriate rate, that 
decision was misguided: the instant case presents none of the statutory or policy 
issues presented in Wilcox. 
If the Court reaches this point in the analysis, it should reverse and 
remand for further proceedings to determine an interest rate that is fair and 
equitable under all the circumstances. The lower court's use of the 2015 post-
judgment interest rate was an abuse of discretion under all the circumstances. 
See Johnston, 2013 UT App 179, ,r 15; Gullickson v. Gullickson, 2013 UT App 83, 
,r 39,301 P.3d 1011 (a court abuses its discretion when it fails "to exercise sound, 
reasonable, and legal decision-making") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 11 (9th 
ed. 2009)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the district court's 
decision and remand with an order that prejudgment interest should be applied 
using the 10% legal rate agreed to by the parties and dictated by statute. If the 
Court disagrees, it should nevertheless reverse the district court's decision and 
remand with an order to consider and articulate the appropriate interest rate 
that should apply under all the circumstances of this case. 
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DATED this 26th day of October, 2015. 
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Stephen K. Christiansen (6512) 
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11 :21 :59 AM Districf:~6'6rt"'Ju'dge / 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTYCSTATE OF UTAH 
DAVID AND RUTH M. FULLER AND 
FULLER'S APPLIANCE PARTS AND 
SERVICE. LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENISE BOHNE AND WESTERN STATES 
INSURANCE AGENCY, 
Defendants. 
~~~--. ----~· 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 100901093 
Honorable Deno Himonas 
This case having been tried to a jury, and the jury having returned a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiffs and against the above-named defendants on October 30, 2014, and the Court now 
being fully advised, 
JUDGMENT is hereby ENTERED in favor of plaintiffs David Fuller, Ruth M. Fuller, 
and Fuller's Appliance Parts and Service, LLC, and against defendants Denise Bohne and 
Western States Insurance Agency, Inc., jointly and severally, as follows: 
I. Damages of $101,595.00 pursuant to the verdict of the jury, representing the full 
amount of property damages awarded to plaintiffs; plus 
001950 
February 24, 2015 11 :21 AM 1 of 2 
2. Pre-judgment interest at the post-judgment statutory rate in effect January I, 2015 
(2.27% per annum) on $101,595.00 from June 13, 2007, through the date of entry 
of the Judgment; plus 
3. Costs of$3,198.17 pursuant to plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs; less 
4. Recovery of $2,000.00 from former defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company 
pursuant to a prior settlement of claims; plus 
5. Post-judgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of entry of the Judgment 
until the Judgment is paid in full. 
<<END OF TEXT OF JUDGMENT>> 
<<JUDGE'S APPROVAL APPEARS AT TOP OF DOCUMENT>> 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
rs-Joseph P. Barrett 
Counsel for Denise Bohne and 
Western States Insurance Agency, Inc. 
(Electronic signature affixed by filing 
attorney with authorization::-:: 
February 24, 2015 11 :21 AM 
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Addendum Exhibit 2: 
Stipulated Jury Instruction No. 29 
• 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
The Fullers seek recovery of prejudgment interest as part of their loss. In Utah, 
prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. If you find 
for the Fullers on their claim of prejudgment interest. you should award them 10% annually on 
the value of their proven loss from the date of the fire to the date of your verdict. 
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Addendum Exhibit 3: 
Final Jury Instruction No. 29 
• 
• 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
Prejudgment Interest 
The Fullers seek recovery of prejudgment interest as part of their loss. In Utah, 
prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. If you find 
for the Fullers on their claim of prejudgment interest, you should award them 10% annually on 
the value of their proven loss from the date of the fire to the date of your verdict. 
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MR. BARRETT: In addition, Your Honor, there was a 
mid-trial motion on rent, in addition - you said pretrial in 
your colloquy. There was also a trial ruling - a trial 
motion-
THE COURT: The motion to dismiss. 
MR. BARRETT: At the close -
THE COURT: At the close of the case. Right. 
MR. BARRETT: Correct. 
THE COURT: You can finish up with the verdict form 
afterwards. What I really need are the instructions to bring 
the jury in. 
sent-
MR. BARRETT: They're done. I think they've been 
THE COURT: Then let's bring -
MR. BARRETT: - they -
THE COQRT: - give me the instructions, let's get 
(inaudible) -
MR. BARRETT: They've been sent to you as 
stipulated. It went, so I don't know if you got it. 
(Inaudible conversation) 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, may I raise one more 
thing along the lines of what we've been talking about? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The way we're putting this case 
to the jury there really are three broad categories of damage 
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items. And they are business property damage, prejudgment 
interest, and lost rent. And I would propose that we haye 
separate lines for each of those, because that's the way that 
I've presented the case. If we're going to break out the 
two, we might as well break out the three. 
MR. BARRETT: So the question is whether prejudgment 
interest needs to be separated? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes. 
(Inaudible conversation} 
MR. BARRETT: Can I have a moment just to take a 
look? 
(Inaudible conversation} 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: No. I'm not asking for 
prejudgment interest on the rent. It's based only on the 
personal property. 
MR. BARRETT: Okay. Prejudgment interest wouldn't 
necessarily be based upon what's (inaudible) property. 
(Inaudiole conversation) 
1MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Right, and we've instructed on 
that, andJI'll argue on that, but -
jMR. BARRETT: So I'm not sure the jury decides -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, if we tell them there's 
three - these three different areas of damages, but then.they 
only have two lines to deal from, it's going to confuse them. 
I don't want to have to be resorting to saying, collapse 
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these two -
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. BARRETT: I'm not opposed. 
THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. Very good. Thank you, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Line them up. Jen's going to make - we 
need - how many copies do we need? Nine, 10, 11 copies when 
they're done. 
Yes? 
(Inaudible conversation) 
THE COURT: Do I have to make any changes to this? 
MR. BARRETT: We have interlineated (inaudible).22B. 
{Inaudible conversation) 
THE COURT: So this is a full and complete set? 
MR. BARRETT: It is, Your Honor. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Can you seal my signature here, and 
{inaudible). Might as well image it. Give me 11 copies. 
CLERK: Just these ones, right? 
THE COURT: Yep. 
(Inaudible conversation from 11:56:38 to 12:02!50) 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, if we can, we were having 
discussion about whether the special verdict form should 
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allow, in addition to a damage line for property as well. as a 
damage line for rent, whether it should also have prejudgment 
interest. And during the break, I was able to look at the 
MUJI, Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, special 
verdict form CV 1899, and it is in the context of a fraud 
instruction, which is a variation of the negligent 
misrepresentation, so I realize it's not particularly 
analogous, but in this, it indicates that counsel should 
specify the type of damages, in this case economic and non-
economic. Our case, there are no non. And damages so the 
judge can calculate prejudgment interest. Your Honor, I 
would prefer that that remain the situation here. 
THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Christiansen. So, I 
mean, you're asking for it, but I - my experience has always 
been the opposite. Where I'm - if there is a dispute, I'can 
- I mean, if there's no dispute -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We've got an instruction in on 
it. 
THE COURT: We can strike the instruction. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, but I want the jury to 
decide whether they're - whether the plaintiffs are entitled 
to prejudgment interest. You're not saying the Court would 
make that determination. 
THE COURT: Well, are you - is there any argument 
about whether -
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interest? 
MR. BARRETT: No -
THE COURT: - they're entitled to prejudgment 
MR. BARRETT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BARRETT: If there's a property damage -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. 
MR. BARRETT: - there's going to be prejudgment 
interest -
THE COURT: Right, so you're - it - your - they're -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Then I'm okay with that. 
THE COURT: Right. Exactly. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: I didn't - I didn't - it's - we're on 
the same page. I don't see that there's a disagreement about 
whether they're entitled to it or not. What I'll do is, it's 
in there, and when we get to it, instruct them to just strike 
it out, that the Court will - well, just strike that out, 
that that's no longer a part of the instructions. And you 
can tell them that. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. Can we take that 
instruction out completely from the jury? 
THE COURT: Just rip out instruction 29. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I'll tell them that we're skipping 
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that, that was a potential we skipped over. How's that?, 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. Excellent. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, so take it out - look, part 
of me - it's a simple calculation, so I really didn't care 
much, because it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it 
in your head. I also don't think, as I said, there's any -
it's - the amount is fine. But as a technical matter, this 
is the better approach. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yep. Okay, so jury instruction 29 is 
withdrawn. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, at what point are you 
going to remove the alternate? 
THE COURT: After it's been - I can't remove him 
until it's been submitted. He won't deliberate with them. 
Under the rules, he'll be excused beforehand. I think that 
that's right. It's slightly different in the criminal 
context, so let's just make sure that's that's right. So, an 
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall 
be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict, 
unless the parties stipulate otherwise and the Court approves 
the stipulation. I don't see any reason why we would keep 
him, and he -
(Inaudible conversation) 
THE COURT: Let him go back to his life as quickly 
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Addendum Exhibit 5: 
Withdrawn Jury Instruction 
No. 29 
• 
• 
• 
• 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
Prejudgment Interest 
The Fullers seek recovery of prejudgment interest as part of their loss. In Utah, 
prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. If you find 
for the Fullers on their claim of prejudgment interest, you should award them I 0% annually on 
the value of their proven loss from the date of the fire to the date of your verdict. 
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T 1-Jlrd Jut..ii,~!a, DiEtrict , 
OCT 3 O 2014 
~t.!..T LA!:.: C•)U~TY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR----------:.:--:-4,.~.;l,, 
6eriul!, Clo" 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID AND RUTH M. FULLER AND 
FULLER'S APPLIANCE PARTS AND 
SERVICE, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENISE BOHNE AND WESTERN STA TES 
INSURANCE AGENCY, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 100901093 
Honorable Deno Himonas 
l. Breach of Agency Duties: Have the Fullers proved this claim against Denise 
Bohne and/or Western States by a preponderance of the evidence? Yes )( 
(If you marked "Yes" go to Question l .a. If you marked "No" go to Question 2.) 
No 
--
a. Were the Fullers also at fault? Yes L_ No 
--
(Go to l.b.) 
b. What are the percentages of fault allocated to each party? 
Denise Bohne/ GO% Western States 
Ruth Fuller 0 % 
David Fuller 0 % 
Fullers' Appliance _!tQ_% 
Total 100% (Go to Question 2.) 
2. Breach of Contract: Have the Fullers proved this claim against Denise Bohne 
No_X_ and/or Western States by a preponderance of the evidence? Yes __ 
(Go lo Question 3.) 
001733 
3. Promissory Estoppel: Have the Fullers proved this claim against Denise Bohne 
and/or Western States by a preponderance of the evidence? Yes __ _ No_x_ 
(Go to Question 4.) 
4. Negligent Misrepresentation: Have the Fullers proved this claim against Denise 
Bohne and/or Western States by a preponderance of the evidence? Yes X No __ 
(If you marked "Yes" to any of Questions 1 through 4, please go to Question 5. Otherwise, stop 
here and have your foreperson sign and date the form and inform the bailiff you have reached a 
verdict.) 
5. What amount, if any, would fairly compensate the Fullers for any harm caused by 
the defendants? 
I I l!lt 1 6"'15"'" Property Damages:$ __________ _ 
Rent Damages: $ ___ ,_Q _______ _ 
(When six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each question that is required to be 
answered, your foreperson should sign and date d advise the bailiff that you have 
reached a verdict.) 
Date I / Jury For~~_ /) A J f) , y« cef JV( - l_jlc,,, bo(?;...--
2 
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Addendum Exhibit 7: 
Memorandum Decision, 
Dated 1/6/15 
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rab.liiu uila a iti&w a 11,uahh 
Third Judicial District 
s 
In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of \J,!fb."i: "'"'" , , 
DAVID FULLER, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
DENISE BOHNE, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 100901093 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
This case was tried to a jury in October 2014. The jury entered a verdict in Plaintiffs• 
favor on two of Plaintiffs' claims. Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs• Motion for Entry of 
Judgment. In the motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter judgment in the full amount of 
damages, plus prejudgment interest. As set forth below, I agree with Plaintiffs that they are 
entitled to ajudgment in the full amount awarded by the jury. However, because additional 
briefing on the question of prejudgment interest is required, I reserve ruling on that portion of 
Plaintiffs' motion until briefing on that issue has been completed. 
BACKGROUND 
In this action, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants1 Denise Bohne and Western States 
Insurance Agency, Inc. (Western States) failed to obtain full insurance for property damage that 
Plaintiffs had requested when they obtained a new insurance policy. Plaintiffs also alleged that 
Defendants incorrectly stated that the policy issued to Plaintiffs contained the requested 
coverage. Based on those allegations, Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit against Defendants, 
asserting causes of action for (1) breach of agency duties (the agency claim), (2) breach of 
contract, (3) promissory estoppel, and (4) negligent misrepresentation (the misrepresentation 
claim). ' 
At trial, the parties agreed to a series of jury instructions, including one instruction that 
dealt with an award of prejudgment interest. However, the parties agreed to withdraw that 
instruction because the amount of prejudgment interest, if any, would be awarded by the Court. 
Defendants also requested a special verdict form. The Court granted that request and the parties 
stipulated to a special verdict form that was given to the jury. On the form, the jury was asked to 
allocate fault on the agency claim. The form did not, however, make any similar allocation 
request with respect to the remaining claims . 
The jury ultimately determined that Plaintiffs proved their agency and misrepresentation 
claims but had failed to prove the breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The jury 
also found that the total amount of damages to compensate Plaintiffs for their loss wo~ld be 
1 Plaintiffs' claims against other defendants in this action were resolved prior to trial. Therefore, I refer to Bohne and 
Western States collectively as "Defendants" in this Memorandum Decision. 
001792 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
$~01,595.00. Pursuant to the instructions on the special verdict form, the jury allocated a portion 
of the fault to Plaintiffs on the breach of agency duties claim, allocating 60 percent of the fault to 
Defendants and 40 percent of the fault to Plaintiffs. The jury was not asked to allocate any fault 
on the misrepresentation claim and there is nothing in the form to suggest what fault, if any, the 
jury would have allocated to Plaintiffs on that claim. 
ANALYSIS 
· Plaintiffs now ask the Court to enter judgment in their favor in the full amount of 
damages awarded, plus prejudgment interest. Defendants contend that the judgment requested by 
Plaintiffs is improper for three reasons: (1) there was insufficient evidence to establish one of the 
necessary elements of negligent misrepresentation, (2) the jury's allocation of fault to Plaintiffs 
on the agency claim should also apply to the misrepresentation claim, and (3) prejudgment 
interest is not appropriate in this case. I address each of these argwnents in turn. 
L The Sufficiency of tlie Evidence 
. Turning to the first argwnent, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to prove their 
misrepresentation claim because Plaintiffs did not show that Defendants had a financial stake in 
the transaction at issue, which is a necessary element of a claim for negligent misrepresentation. 
See generally Atkinson v. lHC Hospitals,·1nc., 798 P.2d 733, 737 (Utah 1990) ("Negligent 
misrepresentation ... occurs when [o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false 
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions .... " (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Specifically, Defendants claim that because the additional 
coverage would have allowed Defendants to receive a greater commission on the sale of the 
insurance policy, the failure to provide the requested coverage was actually detrimental to 
Defendants' financial interest. Based on the evidence presented at trial, I disagree. 
At a minimum, there was evidence presented that Defendants had a financial interest in 
the transaction beca.~se it resulted in Plaintiffs electing to purchase or renew their policy through 
Defendants. While it is true that Defendants' failure to add the additional coverage might have 
resulted in slightly reduced commissions compared to a policy that included the coverage, the 
fact remains that Defendants did receive a commission for the insurance policy that Plaintiffs 
purchased. The commission from that purchase would clearly be greater than receiving no 
commission if Plaintiffs had elected to purchase a different insurance policy from somebody 
else.2 Therefore, it is apparent that there :was evidence that Defendants had a financial or 
pecuniary interest in the transaction involving Plaintiffs, decision to purchase or renew their 
insurance policy. 
II. Whether Allocatio11 Should Apply to Bot/1 Claims 
Next, Defendants assert that the jury's allocation of fault on the agency claim also applies 
to the misrepresen~tion claim, and therefore, Plaintiffs' damages award should be reduced by 40 
percent on both the: agency and misrepresentation claims. In support of that argument, 
2 Indeed. businesses may often offer promotions involving significant discounts on one item or service in order to 
promote purchases of other items or maintain relationships with existing clientele. While the sale of the discounted 
item or service may, stll!iding alone, result in a loss to the business, that discount may lead to more profitable sales 
on other items or over the long run as the business maintains its relationship with customers . 
: .. 
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Defendants claim that if the allocation does not apply to both claims, there would be an 
inconsistency in the special verdict fonn that would nullify the jury's verdict. Plaintiffs disagree, 
arguing that the agency and misrepresentation claims are independent causes of action, each of 
which is subject to a separate allocation. Therefore, Plaintiffs maintain, the verdicts are 
reconcilable.because it would be reasonable for the jury to allocate fault to Plaintiffs on one 
claim and not the other. 
As a preliminary matter, I am not convinced that there is any need to reconcile the 
verdicts because the jury simply did what it was instructed to do when it allocated fault on one 
claim but not the other. The special verdict fonn only asked the jury to allocate fault on the 
agency claim, and the jury did so. Defendants did not request any allocation of fault on the 
misrepresentation ciaim and the special verdict fonn did not include any instruction or option to 
allocate fault among the parties on that claim. Thus, when the jury did not allocate fault on the 
misrepresentation claim, the jury was simply following the instructions on the special verdict 
form. If fault was supposed to be allocated on the misrepresentation claim, Defendants should 
have sought to submit that request to the jury in the first instance, rather than attempting to infer 
that the jury intended ·such an allocation after the jury rendered its verdict. 
Nevertheless, even assuming that there is some conflict between the jury's allocation of 
fault to Plaintiffs on one claim but not'the other, I agree with Plaintiffs that there is a reasonable 
basis for the jury's verdict. Where there is a possible inconsistency in a special verdict, courts do 
"not preswne incorisistency,'' but instead "seek to reconcile the answers if possible. When 
reviewing claims that a jury verdict is inconsistent, [courts] must accept any reasonable view of 
the case·that makes'.thejury's answers consistent. Accordingly, ajury's verdict will be sustained, 
everi in the face of P,ossible inconsistency, if the judgment can be read harmoniously." Tooele 
Associates Ltd P's~ip v. Tooele City, 2012 UT App 214,110,284 P.3d 709, 713 cert. denied 
sub nom. Tooele Assoc. v. Tooele City, 293 P.3d 376 (Utah 2012) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Stated another way, if a court is "[g]iven the choice of two competing 
reasonable alternatives, [the court is] bound to adopt the construction of the verdict that does not 
nullify the jury's answers." Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, Defendants claim that the allocation of fault on the agency claim but not the 
misrepresentation claim would result in an inconsistent verdict because the same allocation of 
fault would apply to both claims. However, as explained above, inferring an intent to al_locate 
fault on both claims would effectively nullify what the jury actually decided; namely, to allocate 
fault to Plaintiffs only on the agency claim. Moreover, while it is possible that the jury intended 
to apply the same allocation of fault to both claims, there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
the jury intended to ·allocate fault on both claims, nor is there anything to indicate what 
percentage of fault would be allocated to Plaintiffs on the misrepresentation claim. Thus, any 
conclusion regarding the jury's intent regarding those questions would be based almost entirely 
on speculation. · 
. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs state, the most reasonable way to resolve any inconsistency in 
the jury's verdict arid give effect to all of the jury's answers on the special verdict form is to 
ass~e that because the two claims involve distinct legal theories, a different allocation of fault 
3 
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applies to the misrepresentation and agency claims. Such a conclusion is supported by the facts 
of this case and the different theories presented in the instructions given to the jury. 
As set forth in the jury instructions, the jury could only find for Plaintiffs on the negligent 
misrepresentation claim if Defendants made a false statement to Plaintiffs that Defendants should 
have known was not true and Plaintiffs reasonably relied on Defendants' statement. With respect 
to the agency claim, Plaintiffs could prevail under several theories, including that Defendants 
failed to follow Plaintiffs' instructions, that Defendants failed to provide important information, 
or that Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in performing their duties.3 Based on the 
evidence presented in this case and these different theories, it is reasonable to assume that the 
jury had separate factual bases for its findings on the two claims that would warrant allocation of 
fault to Plaintiffs solely on the agency claim. 
For example, the jury could have found that Defendants did not exercise reasonable care 
or failed to follow Plaintiffs' instructions in ·obtaining the requested coverage. Under such a 
theqry, the jury may have concluded that Plaintiffs bore some of the fault for the loss because 
Plaintiffs had a duty to investigate any remaining questions and verify that the requested 
coverage was in effect. In contrast, the jury may have declined to allocate fault to Plaintiffs on 
the misrepresentation claim because -Plaintiffs reasonably relied on an affirmative-albeit false-
statement by Defendants. Inasmuch as the reasonableness of Plaintiffs' reliance on Defendants' 
statement would already be established, it would logically follow that Plaintiffs had no duty to 
further investigate the veracity of Defendants' statement regarding the requested coverage. In 
that case, it would be entirely reasonable for the jury to conclude that fault should not be 
allocated to Plaintiffs on the misrepresentation claim. 
Given these different theories for the two claims and the evidence presented at trial, it is 
clear that there was· a reasonable basis for the jury to make different allocations of fault on the 
two claims. Because that is the only way to reconcile any inconsistencies in the verdict without 
nullifying at least one of the jury's answers on the special verdict form, I must presume that the 
jury did not intend to allocate fault to Plaintiffs on the misrepresentation claim. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment of in the full amount of damages, which is $101,595.00. 
Ill Prejudgment Interest 
_Turning finally to the question of prejudgment interest, Defendants contend that an award 
of prejudgment interest would be improper because the Court has not made the determinations 
necessary for an award of prejudgment interest 4 In response, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants 
stipulated to an award of prejudgment interest when the parties agreed to withdraw the 
prejudgment interest instruction from the jury instructions. 
3 Nothing on the special verdict form required the jury to identify which of these theories served as the basis for the 
jwy's verdict on the agency claim. 
4 In their memorandum ·opposing Plaintiffs' motion, Defendants seemingly argued that prejudgment interest might 
be inappropriate because the prejudgment interest statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-l, only applies to contractual 
claims and Plaintiffs' p(operty damage claims were based on theories of negligence. However, at oral argument, 
Defendants acknowledg!!d that prejudgment interest may be awarded in negligence actions to recover for damages to 
property. See generally Vali Convalescent & Care Institutions v. Div. of Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 44S (Utah 
Ct App. 1990) (stating t_hat a right to prejudgment interest exists independent of the prejudgment interest statute). 
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From the record before me, it appears that Defendants did not stipulate to an absolute 
award of any prejudgment interest that Plaintiffs requested. Rather, in withdrawing the jury 
instruction on that issue, the parties agreed that the Court should make the final determination 
regarding prejudgment interest after the conclusion of the trial and add that amount to the final 
judgment. 
In order to determine whether prejudgment interest applies, and if so, what the amount of 
interest is, I must make several subsidiary detenninations, including whether the damage is 
complete, whether the damages can be measured using facts and figures, and whether the amount 
of loss can be fixed as of a particular time. While some of those determinations may be made 
based on the jury's verdict, Defendants correctly point out that some of those determinations 
have yet to be made. Given the parties' agreement that the Court should make the final 
determination of prejudgment interest,. I believe that further briefing on the prejudgment issue 
would be appropriate. Consequently, I reserve ruling on that issue and Plaintiffs' motion until 
briefing is completed. 
In accordance with the foregoing, the parties should submit their supplemental briefs on 
the.prejudgment interest issue within five (5) business days of the date of this ruling. I will hear 
· st 
argument on that i~sue at 2:00 p.m. on the 21 of January. 
DATED this £&ay of January, 2015 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
5 
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I'm going to stick with the June date. 
Mr. Barrett, again, I think that the correct 
analysis - economic analysis would be, when is the date of 
I 
that check to be received? What is the best estimate of the 
date of that check, when that check would be deposited, and 
interest would be able to accrue on that amount. And that is 
why I believe that it's - the June date is the one that most 
closely approximates it. In addition, I think that the lower 
rate is - well, strike that. I'm going to wait on the l9wer 
rate. I want to go back and take a look at a couple of .. 
additional decisions. So, let's say 2:30, conference call? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Do you want us to call you, or 
should we -
THE COURT: Jen will organize it, but we'll chat at 
2:30. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Very good. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MR. BARRETT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken from 9:28:23 to 
2:17:28 regarding this case) 
THE COURT: Hello? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 
MR. BARRETT: Hi, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right, this is - it's the Fuller 
matter, I have Mr. Barrett and Mr. Christiansen? 
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MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes. 
MR. BARRETT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. I have spent some more time 
considering the question of the appropriate rate in this· 
matter, and re-reviewed some of the authorities. I am 
convinced that the post judgment rate is appropriate, not the 
10 percent rate in this matter. 
I think it was 2.16 percent, Mr. Barrett? What was 
it? 
MR. BARRETT: 2.13, Judge. 
THE COURT: 2.13. So, that leaves the question, I 
think, of costs. Mr. Christiansen, what were the cost - are 
there - is there any objection to the amount of the costs, 
Mr. Barrett? 
MR. BARRETT: (Inaudible) -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor - before we leave;the 
post judgment interest rate, can we just hone in on that for 
a minute? The actual post judgment interest rate that's in 
place right now is 2.27 percent. That's what's on the court 
website, and it's tied to federal rate. I think what might 
have happened in the 2.13 percent is, there's a rate that's 
published a few days into January that's the 2.13, but the 
rule is that you apply what was in place January 1, and that 
carries over from something that was in late December -
THE COURT: I - Mr. Barrett? 
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true. 
THE COURT: So, the -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I'm sure -
THE COURT: Let's put it this way, then. The -
whatever the current post judgment interest rate is will be 
the - will operate as the prejudgment rate, and I appreciate 
that clarification, Mr. Christiansen. So, now, with res -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: As of today. 
THE COURT: As of today. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: (Inaudible) I remember, it's. a 
federal reserve rate plus two percent. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I - you know, it's -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: (Inaudible) talking about. 
THE COURT: - I mean, we're talking about some minor 
decimal points here, but nevertheless, let's make - it is a 
known commodity, let's use the known commodity. 
Costs. Are there - is there any objection to the 
request of costs? 
MR. BARRETT: I don't believe so, Your Honor. I 
didn't file an objection to the costs. I assume (inaudible) 
correctly, that they weren't significant, and they're subject 
to the offset of the settlement with the other party, if I 
remember, Steve, is that correct? 
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.T111!gnw11tto include interest, § 3353, 
TJw usun• lnw of 1007 wn11 tnkc11 ulmost ,·er• 
bnlim from thcst11tt1t1-t1 of New York, 
Uaurious bond nnd mortgage enforced, In n 
i;tute whore tliNc• is n stntuto milking usury penul 
but not dec)nring tho contruct \'aid, 1i usurious 
bond nntl mnrlgngo muy bo c11forcml for tho 
umount m,tunlh· duo. 
Bcnilici11cl v.'Finnun, SOU. S. 170; not roportc<l 
in Utnh reports. . 
Interest to maturity of note.. An ngrecmcnt to 
pny int N·cst on n note which pro,•idt•s for "iult•resi 
11t tho rnti, of two per cent pnr month from clnt<-," 
doc:i not ext1•11d boy!Jnd the t.imc snit.I nolc becomes 
duo nnd p11r11ble by its terms. 
Perry v: J'n~·lor, 1 U. 03. 
An account stated cnrries Interest from tluJ clnv 
ofi I l! liq uidnlion. • 
OO(IIJ1, , •. Young, .1 U. M; nffirmed 82 U.S. /'j02, 
Interest on judgment ls statutory. Without 
tlw n11tl111rit ,. nf II Mtntut<- it, is error for I\ ju,Jgn,,,ut 
lo rlir,•cr thnt llw jmlJ.(nwnt. hmr inkrcst. 
lle,-re , .. Knott, 3 U. •l;,l; :!•IP. i57. 
Rule ol pnrtlul payments. The rule, for r.ompul-
lng i11lcr1•tit wh~n tlwn, hu,·u b1•1,n pnrtinl p11y-
llll't1ls is to 11pph· thc p1wm1•11t to the 1lischnrgc ·or 
tlui i11l1•rt•Ht clur., 11ml if'the payment cxc1•c1ls tho 
inlcrt.,;t., t.hi, HUrph1111?nt'>1 lownrd llilll'hnri.,-ing the 
principnl; lf the Jl!1Ymmt bole&< th1111 thc intnrcst, 
the ~11rpl11g of llm mti,rc,sL <111c must not be taken to 
nugnJC111t tho principnl, l)llt intnest eontimws 011 
Uw formnr principal until the 1wriml wlu•n the pny-
mont6 trtk1•11 101-:1,thcr r•xcced tho intcn•Ht d111•, mid 
then the ~urph1H i11 t-0 be nppli"<I townrtl dischnrg-
ing tho princ1pnl. 
l'!!rry v. Taylor, l l.;, 08. 
Compound Interest, In n tl1•crco of (oreclo~uro 
of t.rm•t dcml, compound intr.rcdl, is uot 111low11hlc, 
11ml tho dccrr.c $houldnllow interest only 011 tii~ 
princip11l 11t tho stipulntcd rii.to of IS per 1,cut. 
" Sle~ens Imp. Co. v'. South Ogden L. B. & 1. c ... , 
-0 U. -07; 58 P. 843, 
Wlinro t.he ovhlctico in tho roooril is not suflici.•nt. 
lo justify Ulll uomputulion of lnw.rest upon 1111 ·it• 
count eurrcut, by monthly rest.A, it is crror to ull, '" 
euch.,:;omputntion. 
,Jones, •. Onllighcr, OU. 120; 33 P. 417. 
INTEREST AS DAMAGES: 
If 11 debt ought to be pnid nt n p11rtictilnr 1irn,• 
nnd is not, owing to the clofnult of'tho debtor, tho 
creditor is entitled to intcroat. from thnt timl', by 
wuy or compc11Y11Licm for tho dnluy in puy:Uicnt, 
Young, •. Godbc, 82 U.S. 502. 
Where n purch118<,r nlieci:1 to t1ny into court thie 
purchnRo prwo or 11 mino couocrnmg which t.11'-' ,.,.,,. 
dor hnH litignlion, tho former .wiHbo li11bl•! for w-
tnrl!St <lurlnp: the time ho withholds t.ht• mmw,·. 
Wu~utr:ldllining Co. Y, Creimcnt ?!lining Co:, i r. 
8; 24 P. /i8ll;1111irmod llH. U.S. 817. 
Wlwrc int<'rt•st is rnco\·crnbh, ns tl1\mngca fnr ,i,,_ 
lr_1r in pnynwnL, it is n mnttlir lnrgt'ly in iho cli,cro~ 
tum ol Uw c1111rl•. · 
Culmer\', Cuinc, 22 U. 210; 01 P. 1008. 
In tort for unliquidnto)d tlmnng<'.il, 1,lninllfT !,,•i,I 
err titled to interr.iit frorn timo or bringing uciiou 
Woorllnnd v. U. l'. llN,;27U. 643; 201'. :?US; d1· 
ciclctl 1801 but not re1mi-tocl. 
In tort for u11liqui,l11tc<l.<lnmogcs, interest. 1,11 , i..-
1lumngt'H 11sscsscd froui,lho dnt.r. of.the comn11,111,i-
mc?nt of the ncUonup to the date of tho \·crdi,·t is 
not, rccrn·crnhfo. 
Lester y. 1ligh111ml Bo,· G, l[. Co., 27 U . .170; ;a 
l'. 3-U. . • 
Nichols v. U. P.R. R. Co,, 7 u;·510; 27 I'. m1:i. 
1241x. Maximum rate. Exceptions. 'l'lrn parties to nr1y contract rnay 
ng1·cc i11 writing for the pnymcnt of interest, for the loan or forbearance of nuy 
money, goods, or thfogs in uct;ion, not to cxccccl twelve per cent.. per n111111111; 
pro,lidcd, that 011 lonns of money only to the amount of $100 or less, it 11111~· he 
ng1·eed in writing to take or receive ns interest 011 suicl lon.u not. to exce<~tl -~1 
for the ffri;t mouth only of snid Joun, hnt thcrcnft.cr no g1·c11tcr intcrcs1 shall 
he l'.Oi1tl'nctcd for, taken or received thnn is allowed in this section. Thi:; 
1m1viso sh nil not he construed so as to nllow or permit the spHtting up nf 
trnnsnctions for the Joun of money into small amounts fo1• the pi1rpust• oi 
evnding the provjsions of this title. '07,°1). 43. · . 
l'rior to ndoption of U l:?41~l:?41xll, an 11gr<'cmrnl for nil)" rnto or inton.•st wns luwrul iu Utnh. 
124lxl. Id. No pcr1mu, nHSOl\intion, or corpol'ution shnll directly 01· in-
clirec.tly tnlrn or l'Nmivti in 111011cy, goocls, or thi11g11 in nctiou, or in nu;v olhl'I' 
wny, 1111y greater snm ur grmttcr vnlue rl}r the lonu 01~ ft)J•hen1·nncc ui' ll!IY 
mouey, g0Ulh1, or things in nr.lion. tl11111 is presc1%ctl in § 1241x. · 107. p. 1:t 
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708 INTEREST. 
3316. Continuation of benelita. In the event of the termination of 
membership in the society by the person responsible for the support of any 
child,· on whose account a certificate may have been issued, as provided 
herein, the certificate may be continued for the benefit of the estate of the 
child, provided the contributions are continued, or for the benefit of any 
other person responsible for the support and maintenance of such child, 
who shall assume the payment of the required contributions. 
TITLE 53. 
INTEREST. 
3320. (1241.) Legal rate of interest. The legal rate of interest upon 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or things in action shall be 
eight per cent per nnnum. But nothing herein contained shall be so con-
strued as to in any way affect any contract or obligation made before th~ 
taking effect of this title. Am'd '07, p. 43. 
Judgment to Include Interest, I 7050. amounting lo prlnt'lpal and J& per cent per 
Tho usury law oC 1907 waa ·taken altnoat vcr• annum Interest. 
bnthn Crom the statutell or New York. carter v. Weal, 38 U, 381: 113 P. Hl26. 
Interest on einall loans, t 4384. F:ngert v, Chadwick, 40 o; 239; 120 P. 323. 
Public tunda to draw Interest, I 4600. In an artlon ngalnst R city, rnr extmR under 
In a. stato where there la a statute making a eontr1111t, Interest should ho 11llowed a.t least 
usury penal but not decla.Tlng the contract rrom lhl\ time tbi- rlnlnt was presenlc<f, 
void, o. usurious bond 11nd morti;age may be Wilson v, S". L. City, 61 u. -: 173 P. -. 
entorced tor the amount actually due, 
flernhelacl v. Pirman, 89 U. S. 170; not re• INTEREST AS DAMAGES: 
pnrtecl In Utah reports. If a. debt ought to be llahl at a pnrllcu ln.r 
An 11groement tn pay lntereHt 011 n note tlmo 11ml Is not, owing to tho cletnult or tho 
which provllles tor "Interest 1u the rnte o( two 11l•htor, the creditor Is entltle,1 tn lntere11t frnn1 
1,er cent pur month rrom dn.te," 1loes not ex• that time, by way or compensation Cur the lie• 
tend beyond tho Umo anld note beromee dul! lay In pnyment. 
ancl pnynblo by Ila terms. Young v. 0odhe, R2 U. R. 662. 
Perry , •• 'l'aylor, 1 u. 63. Where a puri:huser 11gree11 to pay Into court 
An account etnted ,·a.1Tles lnlereat from the the purehnso prlco or a mine concerning which 
,111:v uf lls llquldutlon. the vendor has lltl,mllon, the former will ha 
Oodbo v. Young, 1 U. 55; nfflrmcd 82 U. S. llnblo tor Interest clurlng the llmd 110 with• 
r.r.2. hnlrla the money. 
Without tho 11.uthorlty oC a atntute It Is ,v,umkh Mining Co. v. Crescent l\llnlng Co., 
error for a Judgment to •llre<'l that the Ju•lg- 7 11. 8: 2◄ P. r.ss: ufflrmo1l 161 U. S. 317. 
mi,nt bear Interest, Where lntere•t la recnvernble na dnmng<'B fnr 
H<>ec•e v. Knott, 3 U, ~r.l: 24 P, 767. delay In pnyment, It Is 11 matter lurgoly In the 
1'hc rule for com11utlng Interest when there discretion nr tho court. 
hn\·e ooen pnrllnl pnyment11 Ill li> llflJIIY tho (")ulmer v. C11lnP, 22 tr. 216; GI P. 1008, 
11ny111enl In the discharge of the Interest due, In tori fnr unllquldahul dnmngl'II, rlnlnl IIT 
and Ir tho payment excced11 the lntere11t, the held entltlt>d to Interest rrom tlmn o hrl11g-
sor11111s goes toward discharging the p1·lnt•I· Ing a.etlon, 
1~11: tr the payment ho leo11 lhnn the lntere11t, Wondlnnc\ v, U. P. R)',, 27 l.l, G43: 26 l', 
the sur111us or the Interest due must not he 2,s: decl•lecl 1891 hut· 1ull re11orted. 
t11ke11 to augment the prlnclp11I, but lnlel"t'st In tort fnr unllqultlalec\ cl1•m11ge11, Interest on 
rr111lln11011 on tho former principal untll the the dnmng!'B a11Aeallt'd rrom the 1lnt11 or tl1P 
pc-rlocl when tho p1lYmente token together ox• ronnnenrcmt>nl or the nctlon 1111 tu the dntc or 
reecl the Interest due, and lhen the sur11h111 tho vercll,·t le not rccnverahle. 
111 lo be upplled toward 11lschn1·glng the prln- T,eRter v. lllghbuul Roy o. Al. Co., 27 u. ◄70: 
ch»ll, 76 P. 341. 
Porry v. Tnylor, I U. 63. Nichole v, U. P, R. n, Co., TU. 610; 21 I', 
In n cler.ree or rorec,lnsure or trual deed. com- 693, 
111111ml Interest I• not nllnwnble, and the rlerr<"e l111ma,ce11 for Injury to n shipment while 
should nllow Interest only 011 tho prlncl11al at In tran111t l11 the nmount or loaa, with lnli-rPRI, 
the ullpulatecl rnte oC 18 per cent. from the thnP ot rlellnr>·: the fMt thnt Iha 
Ktt>Vc>ns Jn,p, Co, v, Sbuth Ogtlen L. n. & 1, 1lamngo11 nro nnllr111l<lntecl not being by IIRol( 
C'o., 20 u. za7; r.s p, 8(3, reuon ror nnt allowlng Interest. 
'vi tl II I ti 11 l r Fel v. u. P. Ry. Co., 32 u. 1n1: 8R P. 1003. 
,ere 1e ev • cnt'e n 1e recnn II nn su • Interest on cllllnai:-es rnr 11111,1 cnmlemnr.rl 
Oi,lenl to Justify tho computation or lnlPrcal 1thouhl he. computer! from lhl'I time the coni-
1111nn nn account current, by monthly roula, PIIIIY ta.kea POBBl!llslon. 
II le error tn allow such comp11t11llnn. s. P., L. A •. & R. r,. n. Co. v. n,1. or 1,:,hwn-
Jones v, G11Jllghcr. 11 U, 126: 33 P, (17, lion, 32 U, 101; 99 P. 263. 
Wh.ere a: note provhle• ror lntcre11t In reg• Where lntercRl 111 a lt'gi1I r.nna.,.r1ucmt•e or iL 
nlnr lnRtn\monls ·nncl 'the mnker cle(nullcd, hn 1lPmRn<l wlthn11t 11lh>uhlllnn IL ma,y ho re• 
Is lh1hlo for Interest on· tho 1111ma In dcfnoll nt cnvered, thnugh not claimed In the pleu,llngR, 
lhe rnte nt 8 J1P.r c,onl. nn,t lnlcrll~t Is allnw<1rl ·In n tort, ·where per• 
Jcnern v, 1,lchtenstctn, ts U, 320: H6 f'. 1036, 11onnl propcrty IR delitrn)'ed, rrnm tho •dc•lo nC 
RP.cove!')' f11r mnnoy l11nno1l denl•1I HR uncon• the de11tr11cllon 
nt•lnnnl,lo, where I hero: Ima been rc11nhl n Rmn Wheatley v. O. S. T,., .~9 P, JOG; IR.Z. P, 86. 
. 3321. (124lx.) Maximum rate. Exceptions.. The parties to any con-
tract may agree in writing for the payment of interest, for the loan or forbear-
ance o( any money, goods, or things in action, not to exceccl twelve per cent 
per annum; ~ro,dcll'd, that on loans of money only to the amount of $100 or 
less it may he agreed in writing to take or receive as interest on said foan not 
to exceed $1 for the first month only of _saicl loan, but thereafter no greater 
l 
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(llll!I] INTERES'l' 44-0-1-41 -0-8 
TITLE 44 
INTEREST 
"'1--11-1. l,cgnl Ruic. 
The lcg:ll rnte or int1m:st for the loan or for-
hcaram:e of :iny money, goods or things in action 
11hnll be eight per 1:1.mt pur annum. But nothing 
herein contained 11hall be so construed as to in 
any wuy affect any contract or obligation made 
before the Hth d:iy of May, 1907. 
(C. L. 17, § 3320.) 
4'1-0-2, Maximum nutes. 
The 1mrtics to uny contract muy agree in writ-
ing for the payment of interest for the loan or 
forbe:u-:rnce of any money, goods or things in ac-
tion, not to exceed, except us otherwi11e provided 
by law, twelve per cent per annum; provided, 
lhat on luam, of money only, to the amount of 
$100 or le1111, it may be agreed in writing to take 
01· rucch·c as interest on 11uch Joun not to exceed 
$1 for the first month only of such loan, but 
thereafter no greater interest shall be contracted 
for, tuken or receiycd than is allowed in this sec-
tion. This proviso shall not be construed to allow 
or permit the splitting up of transactions for the 
loan of money into small amounts for the pur-
poi-ic of e,•ading the pro,•isions of this title. 
(C. L. 17, § 3:121.) 
l!ult, ur iutcrt••L 11llt1w.sl: On Small Lnnnd, i•ll•li; 'J'c, Jmlu..Lrlnl 
l.unn Cut•1,ors\tinnR. ; .. n.3: i•u 1•11wnbrokcrs. 10-0.2. 
l!!t.~. 1u.-r unnum nnd 1'.~· 1,,.., month. Uu: 1mn1t.•a Uruwu , •• 
Julmsun, 1:1~ /', 5110, 43 U. I, 20 A. I .. It. 1100, 
H-0-:1. Culculuted b,· lhe Yeu. 
Whcne,·er in any statute or deed, or written 
or verbal contract, or in any public or lU'il'ule 
in11t.rument whatever, any certain rate of interest 
is mentioned and no period of time is stated, in-
terest shall be calculated ut the rate mentioned 
by the year. (C. L. 17, § 3326.) 
,t.l-0-•l. Interest un Judgments. 
Any judgment rendered on u lawful contrnct 
shall conform thereto und shall bear the interest 
agreed upon by the 1mrties, which shall be speci-
fied in the judgment; other judgmenti-i shall hear 
interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum. 
(C. L. 17, § 3:3:30.) 
I nl<•r.·•t to lk• inclmlt~I 111 Jud1m11mt enter, .. !, IIM--14,16, 
'l'hiK trl•elion hnH no lll•t•lknliun l'Xt'l'l>t. hl J't•r.imnul jud1mu•t1lK. 
Sidney Sl4!\"en!l ln11,.. t~u. ,,. Sn. Oud.-n L. U. & Jn111. Cc,., 
t.li J'. 8t:I, :?O U. :?Gi. 
H-U-5. Usury-'rnking Excessh-·e Interest a 
l\llsdemennor. 
No person 11hall, directly or indirectly, take or 
recei\'e in services, money or other property, 11ny 
greater sum or grenter rnlue for the 101111 or for-
hcurance of any money, goods or things in action 
than is prescribed in section 44-0-2. Any person 
violating any of the proYisions of this section 
is guilty of a miHdemeanor. (C. L. 17, § :1a22.) 
•14-0-6. Id. Contracts Void. 
All bonds, bills, notes, assurances, convey-
ances, stocks, pledges, mortgages and deeds of 
trust, and all other contracts and securities what-
11oever, and all deposits of goods or other things 
whatsoeYer, whereon 01· whereby there shall be 
reserved or taken or secm·ed, or agreed to be re-
11er\'ed m· taken or secured, any greater sum or 
grenter value for a loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods or things in action than is above 
prescribed shall be void. (C. L. 17, § 3824,) 
•14-0-7. Id. Rcco,·ery oC Payments-Limita-
tion of Action. 
Every person, or in the event of his death his 
personal representati\'es, who shall pay or de-
lh·er any greater sum or value than is allowed by 
this title to be received for or on any loan or for-
bearance, or who shall pay the principal or any 
part thereof of a usurious loan or forbearance, 
may reco\·er from the person who shall have 
taken or received the same the amount of money 
so paid or value delivered, both of principal and 
interest, provided action is brought within one 
year after such payment or delivery. If such ac-
tion is not brought within said one year a11d 
prosecuted with diligence, then the superintend-
ent of public instruction may sue for and re-
cover such sums, with costs, at any time within 
three years after said one ;1,·car, for the use and 
benefit of the state district school fund, and the 
sum so collected shall be forthwith paid into said 
fund. (C. L. 17, § 3323.) 
Althousrh this 11ectlon srlv"• Lhe riJ:ht uf r,,eu,•cry to Lhe bor-
r1tw•r or his JH.•l'!lonnl re1ir,.,.entnUves, In \'lew of 102-1 J.11 n nur-
vlvlni: 11nrt11er m11y mnlnl11ln the netlon. Cobb v. HnrttmaLc,in, 
11,2 I', 424, •Ii U. JH. 
•M-0-8. Id. Repayment of Comiideralion Not 
11 Condillon Pl'eccclent. 
Whenever any borrower of money, goods or 
thing!! in 11ction shall file a compl:iint for the 
recovery of the moner, goods or things in action 
taken 01· l'l'Cei\'ed in violution of this title, it shall 
nol be IWCl!SSlll'Y for him to pay or offer to puy 
1111)' interest whatever on the sum 111· thing 
louncd; nor shall nny court t·equir<l or compel 
the parmcnt or deposit of the principal sum or 
thing, or nny part thereof, 11.s a condition to the 
granting of relief to the b01·1·owe1· In any cnse 
or a usurious loan. (C. L. 17, § 3325.) 
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TITLE 44 
INTEREST• 
::;;:,~ bI .. :t:..!~f!· 
l.:•urF - Tokin,r >;..,...;ve 
Jntt-l'\"11. • Misck1Maanr. 
1,1. Co1nrart1 Vold, 
hi. llocon.,. of l'afmtnl> -
IJmlt&tiOII of Atlwn. 
44-0-1. l.qal Rate. 
•tio:ir.t:c!:ft~,!:!.: 
... t. 
Id. l!ntr•inl1111 Artloa on 
Uaarlauo Contracl - Re-
lurn of S«urlll•._ 
Id, D1,rounlio11 ISt,c<11laLlo 
Par,er. 
The leiral rate of lntercat for the loan or !orbearance o! any money, 
lfOO(l.ol or thlnsr• in action shall lie elx pu cent per annum. But nothlnir 
herein contained ~hall be "° coruotrucd 1111 to In an,- way 111ftd any 
pen11lly or lnlcrut charire which by law 11pplia to delinquent or other 
taiutll or to any cuntrocl or olili?llona made before the 14th clay of May, 
1!107. (C. L. 17, I 3320.) 
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TITLE 15 
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
Chapter 1. Interest, 15-1-1, 15-1-3, 15-1-4 [15-1-2, 15-l-2a, 15-1-5 to 15-1-10 
Repealed). 
2. Legal Capacity of Children, 15-2-1 to 15-2-5. 
3. Interparty Agreements, 15-3-1 to 15-3-4. 
4. Joint Obligations, 15-4-1 to 15-4-7. 
5. Revolving Charge Agreements [15-5-1 to 15-5-8 Repealed] . 
CHAPTER 1 
IN'rEREST 
Section 15-1-1. Legal rate. 
15-1-2. Repealed. 
15-l-2a. Ropealod. 
15-1-8. Oalculated by tho year. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
15-1-5 to 15·1-10. Repealed • 
15-1-1. Legal rate.-The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbear-
ance of any money, goods or things in action shall be six per cent per 
annum. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to in any way 
affect any penalty or interest charge which by law applies to delinquent 
or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made before the 14th day 
of May, 1907. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § l; c; L. 1907, 
§ 1211; a. L. 1911, § 3320; :&. s. rnss, 44.. 
0-1; L. 1936, ch. 42, § 1; 0. 1948, 44-0-1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Tho 1936 amendment reduced the in-
terest rate from 8% to 6,o/o, inserted "any 
penalty or interest charge which by law 
applioe to dolinquent or other taxes or to," 
and substituted "obligations" for "obliga-
tion." 
Prior to F ebruary 14, 1868, there wae no 
torritorial statute. on the subject of inter-
est in Utah. Godbe v. Young, 1 U. 55, 
reversed on another point in 15 Wall. (82 
U. S.) 562-, 21 L . Ed. 250. At that time it 
was enacted, "That it shall not bo lawful 
to take more than 10 per cent interest por 
annum, when tho amount of interest has 
not boon specified or agreed npon.'' (Lawe 
1868, ch. 13, p. 15.) But on February 19, 
1869, thjs act was repealed and the follow-
ing enacted: "'l'hnt it shall be lawful to 
take ten por cont interest por annum, 
when tho amount of interest has not 
been specified or agreed upon." (Laws 
1869, ch. 19, p. 17.) Perry v. Taylor, l U. 
63. The Act of 1809 bccnme Comp. Laws 
1876, § 380, and its provisions remained 
unchanged. (Godbe v. Young, 1 U . 55, re -
versed on another point in 15 Wall. (82 
U. 8.) 562, 21 L. Ed. 250) until it was 
repealed because of its neg11tive char-
acter. Perry v. Taylor, 1 U. 63. 
Thus it v,,il] be seen that former rato 
was 10% per annum. Openshaw v. Utah 
& N. Ry. Co. , 6 U. 268, 21 P. 999. 
Subsequently tho legal rate was changed 
to 8% in the absence of agreement, R. S. 
1898, § 1241. T.his section was repealed by 
Laws 1907, ch. 46, § H, § 1 of which es-
tablished the rate also at 8%, This was 
left unchanged by Comp. Laws 1907, 
§ 1241. 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1935, ch. 42 provided 
tl,at said act should tako effect June 15, 
1935. 
Oross-Reforenccs. 
Finance charges for loans other than 
consumer or consumer related, 70B-3-605. 
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TITLE 15 
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENE~AL 
Chapter 
15-1. Interest. · 
15-2. Legai capacity -of children. 
15-3. Interparty agreements. 
:i5~4. Joint obligations. 
.. •• :, , . 
Section 
15-1-1. · Legar'rate, . 
15-i-4. · Interest on judgments. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTEREST 
· · l~-1-1. Legal rate. The legal rate of interest'for the loan or forbearance .' 
money, g9ods cir"things in action shall be ~ f)el' eent 10% per annum. But 
herein .conta'ihed sh·all _be so cons~i-ued as to i1.1 any way affect a·ny penalty or 
est cha_rge which by ,law applies ·to delinquent . o.r-.,other taxes or to any co 
or obligations made before the 14th day of May, 19M 1981. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, §.I; C.L. 1907, 
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; L. 
1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0°1; L. 
73, § 1. 
15-la4: Interest on judg_nients. Any judgment rendered on a lawful c 
shall conform thereto and,.shall pear the interest agreed upon .by the parti 
shall be spej!ified' ~n the judgment;, other judgments. shall bear -interest at t 
of eigM per~ 12% per annum . 
. History: L. 1907, .ch. ~6, § 11; C,L. 1907, 
§ 1241X9; C.L. 1917, §3330; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2. 
Late payment of property division in•· 
divorce ·action. 
than eight percent for late payment o 
ordered paid in a property division 
divorce action where the property ( 
a"'!ard is re11sonable and equi~a~\e._ PB 
Pope (i978)"589 P 2d 752. · ' · ' · '.v 
This section does not prohibit a dist~ict 
co~_rt from imposing ·an interest rate of more 
CHAPTER 2 
LEGAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN 
Section 
15-2-1. Period of minority. 
262 
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)NTRACTORS' BONDS 
1pted to 
1t of an 
ays was 
Ir period 
)scar E. 
Electric, 
red bond 
·esult in 
default; 
actor all 
·s signed 
ceipt of 
was an 
;s of the 
)ayment 
's insol-
ney Co. 
ment to 
btained 
judgmen t against owner bee 
faih1re to furnish · a liond ause of 0 
t . 1 · to Pr · ma_ ena man, materia l man Was .. o_\e,ct; . 
preJudgment in terest from th e.n.title<1' 
notice to the owner for dem ~ da~" of fi 
~nd _not from the due date i::/f.Payrn;~8 .. ; 
invo!ce, where at time the debate~ on th~. 
credit was being extended to thet IV_as due.: 
by the mate riahnan for alre d contractoe, 
debts. Triple I Supply, Inc. v \Y Past-<1/ l 
Inc. (1982) 652 p 2d 1298. · unset Raue 
Substantial performance. ' 
Doctrine of substantia l ~e f · ' · 
appl!cabl,e_.to this bond/ng st:i°:t_ance ia 
heating subcontract was su6s'tanr 1• Where 
ple ted on December 23 · 1968 f tia ly Corn. 
. . . . • • ac th t 
minor item, a register represenr ·· a one 
percent of the value of the su·· b ·. i9g -001!3&5 
· · contra:-1 
not furni shed un ti l February 19 1 ~ , wa,, 
no~ extend the lim itation period f~~9 _d~• 
action on bond. Carlisle v. Cox (1973) fili ng 
136, 506 .p 2d 60: . 29 U ?.d 
>tect mechanics and materiahnen, etc. • 
rity to 
g party . 
on tract 
:ontrac-
Performance bond. 
This section -provides no auth .'_ ·. ·· 
award attorney fees to the prevaTority to 
in an action b~tween owners. and1 ~~~eiarty 
a performance bond no t required b Y ~n 
chapter. Lignell 1•. Berg (1979) 593 p 2d Y80th1s 
. 0. 
TITLE 15 
,1- CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
.L'!:, 
/ r@hapter 
· :{~~l. Interest. \i~z. Legal capacity of childr~n. 
5 __ 6. Prompt Paymen_t Act\ . 
Th.-7. Registered Public Obhgat1ons Act. 
.j ' 
CH.APTER l 
INTEREST 
Section 
15.1.1. Interest rates -' Legal rate - Contracte\i rate. 
IS-1-4 , Interest on-judgments . 
.:15-1-1. Interest .rates-: Legal rate - Contract_ed rate. ill Except when par-. 
ties to!! lawful contract agree on· !(specified rate Qf interest, the legal rate of. inter-
~ ·fo'r th.e _Joan or forbearance .of any money, goods, or [thlflgs] chose in action 
sb'all be 10% per annum. [~· ~ hereift ~ slttttl] Nothing in this sec-
tion mav be [se] construed [ftS] to in any way affect any penalty or interest charge 
whichby law applies to delinquent or· other t axes or to any. contract or obligations 
made before [the ±4tll day ef] May 14, 1981. 
(2)· The parties !Q !! lawful contract may agree upon ~ rate Qi interest for 
t_hc lo~n Q!: forbearance of ~ money, goods, or chose l!! action. · 
History: ·L. 1907, ch. -46, § 1; C.L. 1907, 
I 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933; 44-0°1; L. 
1935, ch. 42, § l ; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L . . 1981, ch. 
73, § I; 1985, ch. 159, § 6. . 
Compiler's Notes. 
· The 1981 amendment increased the rate in 
the first sentence from 6% to 10%; and 
changed the date at the end of the last sen-
. tence from 1907 t.o 1981. 
.. 15-1-4. Interest on judgments. Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
sliall conform thereto and shall. bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which 
shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate 
of 12% per a nnum. · 
Hi&to ry: L. 190.7, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, 
I 1241X9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933' & C. 
19~3, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73,' § 2. 
Compllcr's·Notcs. 
The 1981 amendment increased · the inter-
est rate from 8% to 12%. 
Late payment of property division in 
divorce action. 
· Tliis section does not prohibit a district 
court from imposing an interest rate of more 
than eight percent for late payment of cash 
ordered paid in a property div ision in a 
divorce action where the prpperty d_ivision 
award. is reasonable and egui ta.ble. Pope v. 
Po~ (1978) 589 P 2d 752. 
Prejudgment interest. 
Prejudgment interest is inappropriate as 
to awards for mental anguish and ·punitive 
damages. First Security Bank of Utah v. 
J ,B.J .. Feedyards, Inc. (1982) 653 P 2d 591. 
373 
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TITLE 15 
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN 
GENERAL 
Chapter . 
1. Interest. 
2. Legal Capacity of Children. 
3. Interparty Agreements. 
4. Joint Obligations. 
5. Revolving Charge Agreements [Repealed]. 
6. Prompt Payment Act. 
7. Registered Public Obligations Act. 
8. Utah Rental Purchase Agreement Act. 
9. Uniform Athlete Agents Act. 
10. Service Contracts Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTEREST 
Section Section 
15-1-1. Interest rates - Contracted rate - 15-1-3. Calculated by the year. 
Legal rate. 
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
15-1-5 to 15-1-10. Repealed. 
15-1-1. Interest rates - Contracted rate - Legal rate. 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the 
subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose 
in action shall be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any 
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other truces or 
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § l; C.L. 1907, 
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; 
L, 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, 
ch. 73, § l; 1985, ch. 169, § 6; 1989, ch. 79, 
§ 1. 
Cross-References. - Payment of interest 
as extending statute of limitations , § 78B-2-
113. 
Rate where unspecified in instrument, § 70A· 
3-118. . 
'l'ime from which interest runs, § 70A-3-112-
Utah Consumer Credit Code,§ 70C-l-101 et 
seq. 
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